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Abstract

This study examines the significance of interactions between German prisoners of
w_ar and their American captors during World War II. It uses government documents,
personal accounts, and newspaper articles to reconstruct various aspects of life in Camp
Crossville, Tennessee, as a representative of the national camp system. It also examines
the recollections of former prisoners, guards, and Crossville residents to assess the
impressions created by prisoner-captor interactions.
These sources demonstrate that camp life created a generally positive impression
among both the Germans and the Americans at Camp Crossville. The POWs attempted
to use their time in captivity constructively, and their interactions with Americans were
usually amiable. While an official "reeducation" policy yielded questionable results,
these social contacts triggered a process of reconciliation similar to that taking place in
occupied Germany.
If American policy fell short of its goals for "reeducation," it did provide an
admirable example of captivity within modem, total war. In contrast to the de
individualization and de-humanization taking place in other camp systems, U.S officials
maintained a commendable degree of humanity. American standards of treatment,
combined with one-on-one interactions, constitute a positive element to a generally
gruesome war.
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Introduction

The train anived at 7:30 in the evening on November 28, 1942. Sixty-eight
German officers, who had left the deserts of Africa only seventeen days earlier, stepped
onto the station platform in Crossville, Tennessee and breathed the autumn air. They
beheld a ring of armed guards, positioned at regular intervals, who hastily directed them
toward a line of Army trucks. After a short ride, they caught their first glimpse of Camp
Crossville, which was to be their home for the next three years. 1
These prisoners were the first of over 1,500 German POWs who would spend the
balance of the war in Crossville. They, along with some 372,000 fellow soldiers
distributed throughout the United States, would gain a unique firsthand look at the
homeland of their purported enemy. For most of them, the time behind barbed wire
would profoundly alter their views of the war, their nation, and their future.
The Focus of This Study2

This is an examination of the effect that internment in America had on the
German prisoners. It begins with the story of Camp Crossville, Tennessee, but becomes
progressively broader as it answers questions about the implications of American
captivity. For instance, what was the nature of everyday life in the U.S. camp system?
How did the camp environment change the German POWs' perspectives? Finally, in
what ways was imprisonment in America unique?
Most existing writings on the German prisoners in America have given a basic

1

Crossville Chronicle (December 3, 1942), 1; "Camp History," 4-H Camp guide, Private Collection of
Conrad Welch, Crossville, Tennessee.
2
For full bibliographical information for these sources, see the List of References.
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overview, with little interpretation. The goal of this study will be to expand upon the
findings of these earlier works by analyzing the greater impact of the German POW
experience. Before providing � detailed explanation of this goal, it is necessary to
summarize the existing historiography.
The Army's own analysis of the camps is available in Pamphlet 20-213, History
of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Anny, 1776-1945, published in 1955
by George Lewis and John Mewha. The authors study decision making at the national
level, focusing largely on the Second World War. Written for the War Department as a
policy assessment, it concludes that the military has entered each war "without adequate
preparation for [prisoners'] employment."3 It recommends that the Army develop
uniform plans for POW labor, to maximize labor productivity in the event of a future
large-scale war. While not an academic study of the national system, Pamphlet 20-213 is
a valuable source of information on the POW employment program.
The first nationwide study of the American camps came in 1970, with Edward
Pluth's dissertation on the evolution of the camp system's administrative structure. The
author emphasizes that the War Department was unprepared for the challenges which
World War II would present, and that its administration was largely improvised. While
he focuses on the arguments and considerations behind policy decisions, Pluth also
incorporates public opinion, international law, and other relevant aspects. The earliest
book on the nationwide system is Judith Gansberg's Stalag USA (1977). Gansberg
focuses on the Special Projects Division (SPD), to show how fears of Nazi influence led
3

George Lewis and John Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776-
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to a reeducation program. She says that German POWs, like many of their fellow
citizens, adopted democracy, but makes no clear argument about how camp life
influenced their decisions. Finally, Arnold Krammer's Nazi Prisoners of War in America
(1979) presents the most comprehensive and informative description of the U.S. camps.
Despite the suggestion in the title, he recognizes the diverse array of political attitudes
among the prisoners. Krammer demonstrates the comfortable standard living in the
camps and the generally positive memories that resonate decades later, but offers no
greater conclusion.
More recent book-length studies have focused on individual states or base camps,
and they usually center on the favorable re_lationship between prisoners and guards.
Perhaps the best is Splinters of a Nation (1989), in which Allan Kent Powell conducts a
case study of the camp. system in Utah. He offers comparisons to camps in Germany and
in the First World War, but makes no greater statement about the implications of
captivity. Another representative study is Allen Koop's Stark Decency (1988). Koop
treats the story of Camp Stark, New Hampshire in isolation, to convey the sense of "an
island of decency in a world at war." Like most local studies, he embraces the theme of
friendly interactions without a broader argument.4
In terms of argumentation, two of the most profound works have dealt with
reeducation. In 1995 came the publication of Ron Robin's The Barbed Wire College
(1995), a detailed analysis of the reeducation program. According to Robin, the

1945 (Washington, D.C., 1955), 262.

4

Allen Koop, Stark Decency: German Prisoners of War in a New England Village (Hanover, 1988), 121.
Additional case studies are provided in the List of References.
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reeducation plan failed to capture the interest of the general POW population, but its
leaders painted the results in a positive light for reasons of self-promotion. 5 Arthur
Smith's The War for the Gennan Mind, published a year later, views the American,
British, and Russian reeducation programs. Taking advantage of recently declassified
sources, Smith provides the first real comparison of POW policy on both sides of the Iron
Curtain, and concludes that, of the three countries, the U.S.S.R. had the most advanced
and consistent plan.
A growing number of studies have also used the POW camps as a prism through
which to view American race relations. A 1995 article by Matthew Schott, entitled
"Prisoners Like Us," compares whites' favorable attitudes toward German prisoners in
Louisiana to their less friendly treatment of African-Americans. In a German-language
study, Die Schwarzen waren unsere Freunde (2002),6 Matthias ReiB argues that POWs
and African-Americans enjoyed a degree of empathy, because both groups found
themselves in a type of "confinement" within the United States.
A few writers have provided narrative histories of Camp Crossville. W. Calvin
Dickinson's article, "Camp Crossville, 1942-1945," provides a basic overview of the
camp. "Barbed Wire in the Scrub Oaks," a feature in Tennessean Magazine in 1968,
contains a collection of anecdotes about life in the camp for both guards and prisoners.
Finally, Major Herston Cooper, a former stockade commander at the camp, published
Crossville: How Did We Treat Our POWs? More of a quasi-memoir than a history of the

5

Ron Robin, The Barbed Wire College: Reeducating German POWs in the United States During World
War II (Princeton, 1995). A more in-depth treatment of Robin's argument can be found in Chapter 3.
6
"The Germans Were Our Friends."
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camp, Cooper's manuscript recounts army regulations and magazine articles, with
intervening collections of personal recollections. Like other local studies, these works
have provided information about the camps and insights into the public's memory of
them, but have not offered any interpretation of the POW experience.
Several themes emerge from a survey of the above materials. First, it is clear that
American policymaking was problematic. Lewis and Mewha point out that the Army
consistently failed to plan ahead, and Pluth shows that policy remained inconsistent well
into the war. According to Smith, the same inconsistency plagued American reeducation,
even after the war. From a variety of perspectives, then, planning with regard to POWs
appears flawed.
Second, Americans and Germans enjoyed an amiable relationship in the POW
camps. Most studies, especially the local histories� simply present this fact as their
conclusion, while writers like ReiB and Schott use prisoners' comforts as a backdrop for
unjust treatment of African-Americans. There is clearly a consensus that German and
Italian POWs enjoyed comfortable standards in the U.S. camp system.
Third, the Germans embraced Westem democracy after the war. Gansberg ends
her book by saying that a democratic Germany emerged, despite adversity. Similarly,
Robin says that denazification took place in spite of the abysmally flawed reeducation
policy. A consensus thus exists that, for whatever reason, democracy triumphed in
Germany.
This study will connect these three themes, to make a stronger statement about the
nature of captivity in the U.S. It will show that, in spite of the clearly flawed reeducation
5

policy, one-on-one interactions between Germans and Americans significantly
contributed to reconciliation between the two countries. Rather than completely
dismissing American planning, however, it will also demonstrate that official policy
helped to preserve a sense of humanity within modem warfare.
The first two chapters paint a picture of Camp Crossville as a representative of the
national camp system. While relying heavily on evidence from the Crossville experience,
they use data from other camps to show the universality of certain aspects of camp life.
Chapter 1 describes the vast freedoms that prisoners enjoyed, as well as the degree to
which they attempted to make the most of their imprisonment. The second chapter
examines the interplay between the German POWs and American citizens, and confirms
that a generally friendly relationship existed. After defending the government's assertion
that kind treatment benefited the U.S. war effort, it argues that this benevolence extended
well beyond official policy.
Chapter 3 places the effort to reeducate the German prisoners within the larger
"denazification" policy. After providing a description of the program, it suggests that
official reeducation was ineffective. Drawing on examples from the previous chapter, it
argues that bottom-up interactions compensated for this flawed program. Alongside Cold
War tensions, these one-on-one contacts allowed both Germans and Americans to move
beyond a stance of hostility. If the official effort failed to "denazify" Germany, these
factors rescued that objective.
The final chapter compares the American reeducation plan to those of Britain and
the Soviet Union. Drawing on larger historiographical themes, it analyzes the impact of

6

total and ideological war on modem captivity, including POW camps, gulags, and
concentration camps. It argues that the assignment of a radical/liberal dichotomy to
modem captivity is an oversimplification, because modem total war imposed similar
changes on both Soviet and Western notions of internment. However, it shows that U.S.
policy continued to uphold the liberal spirit, and thus set an important example for
twentieth century societies at war.
Sources
An examination of the American camp system requires an understanding of
government policy, public opinion, and everyday life within the camps. As mentioned
earlier, this study relies heavily on firsthand accounts from Tennessee to establish the
nature of camp life. Any work that draws on such anecdotal evidence is necessarily
inductive, but connecting these local accounts to national trends will reinforce the
conclusions drawn from the Crossville experience.
Government Records

Federal and military records provide a glimpse at decision-making on the national
level, as well as some camp-specific information. The records of the Army Fourth
Service Command and the Provost Marshal General's Office (PMGO) are available in
Record Groups 338 and 389, respectively, in the National Archives. Among these
records are correspondence among camp officials, camp inspection reports, civilian
complaints about the location of Axis prisoners in the United States, and the "Poll of
German Prisoner of War Opinion."
The U.S. House Committee on Military Affairs conducted two "Investigations of
7

the National War Effort," to determine whether civilian complaints about the "coddling"
of POWs were warranted. Their official reports contain testimony from the Provost
Marshal General, provide detailed descriptions of several camps throughout the country,
and evaluate the validity of civilian complaints.

Media

National newspapers and magazines are indispensable in understanding the

American public's views, as well as their knowledge, of the camps. Media sources
provide official press releases, civilian opinions on "coddling" and race issues, and
speculations about postwar policy toward Germany. In addition, they occasionally
contain government officials' perspectives, like J. Edgar Hoover's article, "Enemies at
Large," in American Magazine.
Tennessee newspapers give similar perspectives on national and regional issues.
They record announcements on camp planning and construction, contain notices of
prisoner escapes, and carry public statements from camp officials. The Crossville

Chronicle and the Nashville Tennessean have been extremely helpful in reconstructing a
time line of major events at Camp Crossville.
Other important media sources are the German-language newspapers produced by
the German prisoners of war themselves: Die Briicke (The Bridge) and Die Kolibri (The
Hummingbird). A survey of the articles gives the reader a sense of POWs' interests and
activities, and features on American history and politics reflect the strategies of the
reeducation program.

8

Individual Voices

It would be impossible to reconstruct life in Camp Crossville without the
memories of former prisoners, guards, and workers. Those who experienced the camp
firsthand not only fill in minute details about everyday events, but also provide their own
opinions. Hans Albert Smolinski Albertson and Gerhard Hennes, both of whom were
second lieutenants in the Afrikakorps, have written summaries of their experiences in
Camp Crossville. Their memoirs can be found in the Tennessee Technological
University Archives, along with an oral history interview with Hennes, conducted by
TIU faculty. Conrad Welch, the former director of the 4-H camp in Crossville, has saved
letters from Hermann Treis, a former POW, and Howard Newton, who had been a guard.
My own correspondence and conversations with Albertson, Hennes, Newton, and other
subjects have supplemented these written accounts.
The physical remnants of Camp Crossville have long since deteriorated.
However, the memories and emotions of those who experienced the camp have survived
through the resources mentioned above. By weaving these perspectives together, the
hope is to reconstruct a vision of a community that has long since vanished.

9

Chapter 1
Camp Crossville: Life Inside the Barbed Wire
In December 1944, Edouard Patte, an inspector for the YMCA, arrived in Camp
Crossville. He had accepted the prisoners' invitation to attend a Fine Arts Exhibition,
and on the morning of December 9, twelve German officers escorted him through the
exhibit hall. Patte was amazed by the collection, which comprised over 400 pieces. He
beheld a series of landscapes, still-life paintings, and "impressive Africa war scenes."
His report described "two hilarious masks of terracotta," a series of busts and engravings,
and a ''Tyrolian accordion player made in wood." A wall clock, made from scrap wood,
kept perfect time on the wall. Reflecting on the collections of model airplanes, insect
collections, and replica military medals, Patte reported that the Exhibition was "a tribute
to the workmanship, the artistic achievements and the imagination of the POW's."7
The Exhibition's diverse collection of artwork serves as a metaphor for everyday
life within the stockade. In Crossville, as in other camps, German prisoners enjoyed a
high level of freedom and comfort, which they devoted to constructive pursuits. In
providing the basic history of Camp Crossville, this chapter will demonstrate the various
ways in which the POWs sought to create a meaningful existence out of captivity.
The Creation of the Camp System
In the First World War, captured German soldiers had remained in Europe, and
authorities in the United States had been responsible for only 1 ,346 naval prisoners. In
August 1942, however, the transfer of 50,000 German prisoners from Great Britain

7

Edouard Patte, "Report on Visit to Prisoner of War Camp Crossville, Tennessee," December 8-9, 1944,
RG 389, Entry 459A, Box 1612, National Archives.
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demonstrated that the Second World War would present a much greater logistical
challenge to the U.S. Provost Marshal General's Office (PMG0). 8 The division quickly
established new sites for camps throughout the country, and later expanded the system as
enemy soldiers surrendered en masse, first in Africa, and later in Europe. At its peak, the
American camps held 371,683 prisoners, whom they distributed among 155 base camps
in every state but North Dakota, Nevada, and Vermont.9 Four of the camps were located
in Tennessee: Camp Crossville, Camp Forrest (Tullahoma), Camp Campbell, and the
Memphis Armed Service Forces Depot. 1 0
Officials generally tried to place the camps in thinly-populated agricultural areas,
and Camp Crossville was no exception. The proposed site lay in Cumberland County,
Tennessee, which held a population of 15,592 in 1942. It lay five miles southwest of
Crossville, population 1,511, and the largest town within thirty miles was Cookeville, a
town of 4,364. The Crossville site also had the benefit of lying near a railway line and
several highways, which would allow easy access for construction, supply, and the
transportation of the prisoners. In a preliminary report about the site and its surroundings,
the inspector noted that the "local supply of common labor" could be supplemented, if
necessary, by workers from Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville. The site met the
approval of the Provost Marshal General, who approved the construction of a 200-acre
8

Lewis and Mewha, 57; Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America (Lanham, MD., 1979), 2.
There were also many smaller "branch camps" tied to these larger camps, whose purpose was to disperse
POW labor in agricultural areas. House Military Affairs Committee, "House Report 728: Investigations of
the National War Effort," prepared by Andrew May, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 7; Edward Pluth, "The
Administration and Operation of German Prisoner of War Camps in the United States During World War
II," Ph.D. diss., Ball State University, 1970, 128.
10
'camp Campbell was in Kentucky, but it extended into Montgomery County, Tennessee. House Military
Affairs Committee, "House Report 1992: Investigations of the National War Effort," prepared by Andrew
9
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installation on June 29, 1942. 1 1 Designated an officers' camp, Crossville would remain
relatively small. Its official capacity was 1,700, and at its peak in early 1945 it probably
held at least 1,500 inmates. 1 2
The people of Cumberland County were actually more than willing to host the
facility. Local residents enlisted the aid of their congressman, Albert Gore, Sr., in
acquiring more information about the plan, and the Crossville Chronicle reported that "no
effort [was] being spared . . . to aid in the location of the camp in this county." At least
one resident, Mrs. J.L. Wyatt of Cumberland County, wrote to the War Department to
offer private land for the project. Upon official approval, the Chronicle reported
"excitement and jubilation" at the news, and quoted a local businessman who called the
project "the most wonderful thing that has ever happened to Cumberland County." 1 3
According to Herston Cooper, the stockade commander, this enthusiasm was a
testament to their sense of "civic obligation in the war effort." He also emphasized the
selflessness of the act, since the installation would not provide an overwhelming number
of jobs. 1 4 Indeed, a patriotic spirit did exist in Cumberland County, as indicated by

May, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944, 18; Krammer 28; W. Calvin Dickinson, "Camp Crossville, 1942-1945,"
Journal of East Tennessee History 68 ( 1996), 31.
11

Krammer, 26; Office of the Chief of Engineers, "Memorandum on Engineering Features of Site for
Alien Enemy Internment Camp Near Crossville, Tennessee," May 14, 1942, RG 389, Entry 457, Box 1420,
National Archives; War Department Memorandum to the Chief of Engineers, June 29, 1942, RG 389, Entry
457, Box 1420, National Archives.
12
Records from May 1944, before the Normandy invasion, show that Crossville held 1,442 prisoners. The
population presumably peaked near the end of the war, and by July 1945, after consolidation of the camp
system had begun, the population had fallen to 1,363. Army Service Forces Lists, May 1, 1944; July 1,
1945, RG 389, Entry 435, Box 8, National Archives.
13
Letter from Albert Gore to the Provost Marshal General, July 7, 1942, RG 389, Entry 457, Box 1420,
National Archives; Letter from Mrs. J.L. Wyatt to the War Department, April 24, 1942, RG 389, Entry 434,
Box 407, National Archives; Crossville Chronicle (April 23, 1942); (July 2, 1942).
14
Herston Cooper, Crossville: How Did We Treat Our POWs? Special Collections Library, The
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, 198 1, 28.
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residents' active participation in the War Bond effort. 1 5 But regardless of the actual
number of potential jobs, residents certainly foresaw economic benefits in the
proposition, as well. Reports in the Crossville Chronicle in the spring and summer of
1 942 frequently mentioned the $3,000,000 price tag on the proposed camp, often adding
that construction would rely heavily on local labor and resources. Cumberland County
residents anticipated "great and lasting benefit" for the area, because the new facility
meant "increased business, citizenship and prosperity," and they petitioned Congressman
Gore for information regarding "positions, concessions, etc." at the installation.
Combined with a sense of patriotic duty, this anticipation of greater prosperity made the
camp a popular addition to the county. 1 6
At first, residents had only vague notions about what the new installation's
function would be. Many presumed that it would be an internment area for civilians with
ethnic ties to Axis countries, presumably Japan, and so the facility became known as "the
Jap Camp." The Chronicle, assuming that whole families would be interned, explained
to residents that the aliens were not "necessarily bad people." Finally, in mid-July of
1942, the Provost Marshal General's Office dispelled the rumor about civilian internees,
explaining that the installation would be an "Officer Prisoner of War Camp," and the
newspaper relayed the news. Soon after, local residents learned that the inmates would be
German and Italian soldiers, but the nickname had already stuck. Sixty years after the

15

Cumberland County ranked fourth in the state in the 4th Bond Drive, raising over $48 1,000. Crossville
Chronicle (March 9, 1944), 1.
16
Crossville Chronicle (April 9, 1942); (June 29, 1942); (July 2, 1942); (August 6, 1942); Letter from
Albert Gore, July 7, 1942; RG 389, Entry 457, Box 1420, National Archives.
13

war, the road leading to the camp would be known as "The Jap Camp Road." 17
The Camp
The stockade at Camp Crossville consisted of two twelve-foot barbed wire fences,
with guard houses along the outside perimeter. Within the stockade sat the Stockade
Commander's Office, the camp hospital, the barracks, latrines, mess halls, and the
prisoner canteen. The individually fenced-in compounds separated the quarters of
German officers, German enlisted men, Italian officers, and Italian enlisted men. Outside
the stockade stood the Camp Commander's Office, staff quarters, administrative
buildings, the auditorium-gymnasium, the camp fire house, and the guard house. 1 8 It is
important to remember that little interaction took place between the two areas, which
were, for the most part, different worlds. American personnel generally only entered the
camps during inspections or on other such formal business, and guards were, at least
officially, forbidden to casually converse with prisoners. 19 Major incidents aside, the
German POWs themselves were in charge of affairs within their camp.
It did not take long for the incoming POWs to make the camp their home. Hans
Albertson, a German Second Lieutenant who arrived on April 28, 1 943, observed that the
new camp "looked rather barren and sterile--no trees within, no bushes, just gravel roads
and barracks !" But within a few months, the "green thumbs" among the prisoners went
to work, and the grounds became adorned with flowers, plants, and bushes. 20 As officers,
17

Crossville Chronicle (April 9, 1942); (April 23, 1942); Dickinson, 32.
"Behind the Wire." Time (June 2 1 , 1943), 64; Cooper, 33-4.
19
Congressional Report 1992, 10.
20
Hans Albert Smolinski Albertson, "My Memories of the Prisoner of War Camp in Crossville,
Tennessee," Unpublished Manuscript, March 8, 1993, Special Collections Library, The University of
Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, 2.
18
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the majority of Crossville's prisoners enjoyed relatively comfortable living space. Two
prisoners shared a ten-foot-by-ten-foot bedroom, and two bedrooms shared a common
area furnished with a stove, closets, a table, and chairs. Some prisoners used scrap
lumber pile to build additional furniture, and wall decorations included photos of
scantily-clad women from the pages of Esquire Magazine. 2 1
As in other POW camps, prisoners in Crossville followed a daily routine. Shortly
before 8 a.m., they. would be awakened for breakfast.22 A roll call immediately followed
breakfast, and work or leisure time then commenced until lunch at noon. The 6 p.m. roll
call, which often consisted of several head counts, was described by Albertson as "the
main event of the day." Dinner followed at 6:30, followed by more free time. The
compound gates closed around 10 p.m., but there was no curfew within the individual
compounds. 23
Judging from oral histories and memoirs, one of the most memorable facets of
camp life was mealtime. Albertson remembers that he "received excellent food, well
prepared, and more than enough." Prisoners enjoyed delicacies which they hadn't had in
years, such as eggs, bacon, and coffee. Hennes says that he "learned to eat, and
appreciate," items like com, squash, sweet potatoes, and melons. The cafeteria employed
German cooks, who whipped up pies, cream puffs, tortes, and other desserts. At the end

21

Gerhard Hennes, "The Barbed Wire: POW in the USA," Unpublished Manuscript, 1985, Tennessee
Technological University Archives, Cookeville, Tennessee, 37; Albertson, 2; Telephone Interview with
Gerhard Hennes [Hereafter, "Hennes Phone"], December 7, 2003, 17.
22
Hennes remembers being awakened by a bell outside the dining hall, while Albertson remembers a
German officer blowing a whistle. Gerhard Hennes, interview by Todd Jarrell, et al. [Hereafter, "Hennes
TTU], Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee, 19; Albertson 3.
23
Albertson, 3 ; Hennes, 40. Hans Albert Smolinski Albertson, Letter to Gregory Kupsky [Hereafter,
"Albertson Letter"], January 18, 2004, 6.
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of meals, Albertson says, kitchen staff distributed leftover food for prisoners to take with
them. 24
Using their canteen coupons, prisoners could also purchase a vast variety of
merchandise, including clothing, personal items, candy, and tobacco. The Provost
Marshal General's office stipulated that special orders for prisoners were prohibited, but
at Camp Crossville, POWs could order from a Sears-Roebuck catalogue supplied by one
of the guards. In addition to the official inventory, Crossville's prisoners used the
· catalogue to procure items such as window curtains, tablecloths, tennis shoes, and
lingerie for their girlfriends in Germany. 25 This purchasing power, along with the
abundant food allotments, would eventually come under fire from the American pubilc,
as will be described in Chapter 2.
Labor

Early in the war, American authorities saw the prisoners of war as an
inconvenience and as a security threat. According to Archer Lerch, the Provost Marshal
General for most of the war, the POWs presented an "economic and administrative
burden," and were "a drain on the manpower of our army." By early 1943, however, the
prisoners seemed relatively cooperative, and authorities began to view them as an
"untouched pool of available manpower . . . at a time when manpower was a desperately
needed commodity."26 By putting the prisoners to work inside and outside the camps, the
24
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government would tum their perceived burden into a blessing.
In accordance with the Geneva Convention, the U.S. could require enlisted
prisoners to work, provided that the work was not dangerous and did not directly benefit
the war effort, such as producing munitions. Officer POWs could not be required to
work, but could work if they chose, and NCOs could only be employed in supervisory
roles. 27 Enlisted workers initially received eighty cents per day, in addition to the ten
cents given daily to all enlisted men. After April 1944, an incentive system allowed them
to make as much as $1.20 for a day's work. Throughout the war, officers received
between $20 and $40 per month, depending on rank. All pay was in the form of canteen
coupons, and outstanding balances at the time of release would be paid in German
currency. 28
· Nearly half of Crossville's inmates were enlisted men, despite the camp's
designation as an officers' camp. In accordance with Army Regulations, they were to
serve as orderlies for the officers, although Cooper recalls that most of them "possessed
an excellent skill at being busy at something else." Many of them found the work
. program to be a perfect escape. But for those who refused to do work of any kind,
officials found the nationwide "no work, no eat" policy to be instrumental in changing
their minds. 29
A priority system governed the types of work for the prisoners. "Essential Post
27
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and Army Work" was the first priority, which included in-camp maintenance and
construction, as well as services for other prisoners, such as barbers, cooks, and janitors.
The second priority was the filling of work requests from government agencies and
private employers, which were screened and approved by the War Manpower
Commission (WMC). Once prisoners filled these roles, camp officials could apply
manpower to "useful but not necessarily essential work" in camps. 30
The main benefit of POW labor was its use by private employers. To gain a
contract to use prisoners of war, an employer submitted a "Certification of Need for
Employment" form, in which he or she described the type of work, the number of
workers and man-hours needed, and the rate of pay. To prevent a conflict with American
workers, the WMC also required proof that local employees could not fill the contractor's
need, and that the rate of pay did not undercut that of free labor. If the government
approved the project, the local camp agreed to transport, guard, and feed the workers,
while the employer was responsible for training, equipment, and supervision. The
employer directly paid the War Department, which paid the worker in canteen coupons.
The prisoners received the rates described above, and the War Department kept the
difference. 3 1
For prisoners at Crossville, work outside the camp was usually on private farms,
but according to one report, some also worked for the Tennessee Valley Authority and the
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University of Tennessee. 32 An article in the Crossville Chronicle in late 1944 praised the
success of the program, and advised local farmers who were "unable to find local labor"
to contact the WMC office in Rockwood, Tennessee. 33 The program did meet some
success in Cumberland County: as of August 1945, 160, or about 20% of the German
officers, had volunteered to work alongside 202, some 30%, of the enlisted men. 34
The proportion of officer volunteers does demonstrate, however, that they were of
two minds on the issue of voluntary labor. Hans Albertson welcomed the opportunity to
work, despite his exemption as an officer. He had struck up a friendship with Colonel
Harry Dudley, the camp commander, who allowed him and a friend to grow crops on a
nearby farm. Enjoying the opportunity to walk to the farm and spend the day outside the
stockade, Albertson and his friend eventually allowed "applicants" to join in the project.
For Gerhard Hennes, on the other hand, work was not an option. He joined the majority
of officers who refused to be seen "currying favors with our captors. "35
Nationwide, the labor program was a success. By 1945, an estimated 95.6 percent
of employable prisoners were working. By war's end, the PMGO estimated that these
prisoners contributed approximately 34,219,185 man-days of labor to the nation's
economy, of which Crossville provided 29,834. 36 The Provost Marshal General
estimated that, in 1944, private contracts netted the government $22,000,000 dollars,
while POW labor on Army installations saved an additional $80,000,000. Furthermore,
32
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prisoners reportedly saved countless acres of crops that would otherwise have been lost
due to manpower shortages. 37 As these numbers show, authorities managed to tum a
perceived burden into a handsome profit.
Free Time

Because most of the officer prisoners at Crossville did not have to work, they
were free to find other pastimes during the day, and athletic competitions became a
favorite. Using sports equipment supplied by the Red Cross and the YMCA, prisoners
created handball, soccer, tennis, and volleyball leagues, of which tennis and soccer seem
to have been the most popular. Prisoners constructed four tennis courts throughout the
camp, and match highlights appeared regularly in Die Briicke, the POW newspaper. The
paper also provided weekly soccer scores, and frequently commented on the excitement
of the crowd at the games. 38 For prisoners like Hennes, who was active in both sports,
the weekly matches were among the most memorable aspects of camp life. 39
In terms of organization and participation, the only program that exceeded
athletics was the educational system. Prisoners taught and attended courses on dozens of
subjects, from foreign languages to sciences to woodworking. The program developed
very quickly, and a "cultural inventory" conducted by the YMCA in May 1 943 found that
20% of Crossville's prisoners attended classes in the summer, and 35% enrolled in the
winter semester. By 1945, several American universities had even agreed to recognize
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college-level courses taken in the camps, and both Hennes and Albertson received a year
of credit from the University of Minnesota.40
A number of inmates also participated in the arts. A group of actors formed a
theater troupe, and among their productions was a rendition of Julius Caesar, complete
with armor made from tin cans. Hennes, who attended the production, remembers that it
was competitive with . . . the city theater in Coblence. ... You saw these Roman
soldiers running across the scene, and their armor was tinkling, and their swords
were rattling, and I tell you, it was some production ! And the American camp
leaders and some soldiers had front seats ! 41
The musicians in the camp assembled both a choral group and a forty-piece orchestra,
using instruments donated by the YMCA. Smaller musical groups formed within each
compound, and would play for their respective companies during the day. Painters,
sculptors, and other artists participated in exhibitions like the one described above.42
Crossville's inmates also spent their leisure tine in less formal pursuits. An
inspection by the Special Projects Division in January 1 945 found that prisoners at
Crossville had access to 6,000 library books, and that 75% of the volumes were in
constant circulation. In addition, the library provided periodicals like Time, Collier 's,
The Saturday Evening Post, and the New York Times, as well as Die Briicke and Die
Kolibri, which the prisoners themselves published. German soldiers also listened to

records, boxed, played darts, gambled in makeshift casinos, and engaged in a myriad of
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other activities to pass the time.43
Despite the comfortable living conditions and the wide range of activities, many
German prisoners recall a dark side to camp life. Towards the end of the war, even the
most active men in the camp could not remove their fears about the war's outcome or
their concern for relatives in Germany. Hans Albertson remembers pacing the grounds at
night, unable to sleep for fear that his family might be harmed. While interned in
Memphis, Edwin Pelz felt guilty about receiving packages from the Red Cross. He
remembers that
these packages made us sad rather than happy. In our prisoner-of-war camp . . . we
had enough to eat and enough of everything else. We knew how bad things were
in Germany. The intentions of the German Red Cross were good, of course, but
they shouldn't have sent us anything.
For Gerhard Hennes, the inability to aid in the war effort meant a certain loss of selfworth. It was upsetting to know that he had been "shoved aside, lived in the shadows,
and had no more use to the Fatherland."44 Despite their own relative safety and comfort,
prisoners could not escape thoughts of the ongoing destruction overseas.
In April 1945, camp administrators initiated one of the most controversial aspects
of the American camp system. Within a few weeks, camps throughout the U.S.
drastically cut prisoners' rations, citing a worldwide food shortage. The results were felt
immediately among the prisoners, who quickly began losing weight. At Crossville,
Hennes remembers a prisoner passing out a roll call. Throughout the country, employers
43
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complained that their workers were unable to do a full day's work. The War Department
publicly denied that rations were substandard, but the testimony of prisoners and
employers suggests otherwise. 45
A few different factors help to explain the food cuts. First, now that German
defeat was imminent, the U.S. no longer had to fear that mistreatment would bring
retaliation against American POWs. As for the motivation behind the policy, there are
two possible explanations. One is the PMGO's assertion that the change was a response
to a general shortage of foodstuffs. After all, the War Department pointed out, it had also
cut G.l.s' rations.46 But many wondered whether the change had to do with returning
American POWs, who told tales of harsh treatment and inadequate food. The PMGO had
indeed come under fire for German prisoners' comfort levels, and on April 1 8 it
admonished commands to stem the "public relations problem" by making sure "that POW
regulations are rigidly enforced . . . regarding food conservation."47 Whether or not this
was the true motivation, it is significant that many German POWs believed it was.
According to Pelz, he and his fellow inmates "understood that the food shortage in the
camp was primarily punitive." Hennes saw the ration cuts as a "new policy of treating the
Germans a little rougher." Albertson, who denies that the cuts were a "starvation diet,"
does see the policy as a direct result of the inevitable German defeat.48 In general,
prisoners saw the food cuts as a break with what was otherwise a pleasant experience.
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Release and Repatriation

The Geneva Convention requires that "repatriation of prisoners shall be effected
with the least possible delay after the conclusion of peace. ,,49 However, there were
several delays in the departure of the German POWs from the United States. Because
many American soldiers were still overseas, the Secretary of Agriculture requested an
extension of POW labor contracts to fill the persistent labor shortage. More extensions
followed, until President Harry Truman finally set a deadline of June 1946 for the
removal of all prisoners from the United States.50
Unfortunately for most prisoners, Germany was not their first destination. The
U.S. turned over thousands of POWs to West European countries, especially France, for
use in labor battalions. Exempt from the transfer were selected groups of non-Germans,
as well as those "with sincere democratic convictions and special skills." According to
Krammer, those turned over to France spent an average of four to six months performing
mandatory labor before being sent home. Other prisoners, including Gerhard Hennes and
Hans Albertson, spent several weeks in holding camps with hundreds of thousands of
Displaced Persons (DPs) and recently-surrendered German soldiers. Due to
overcrowding and food shortages, conditions in these camps were horrendous, and
survivors report scenes of widespread starvation. Hennes, who spent time in the camp at
Attichy, estimates daily rations to have been about 1,000 calories. He recalls that his
father, a fellow prisoner, never fully recovered from his six-week stay in Attichy. 5 1
49
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The idea of retaining prisoners in Europe did not sit well with the American
public. Christian Century, for instance, launched a series of tirades against the policy,
which it equated with slavery. Holding prisoners indefinitely, the Century argued, was in
"cynical disregard of the laws of morality and in contempt for future consequences to
international peace." The articles assured readers that continued use of POW labor would
only undermine the Germans' positive impression of their captors. Taking such
criticisms to heart, the Army washed its hands of the labor battalions in France, and
relinquished custody of its last prisoners on June 30, 1947.5 2
Taken together, the ration cuts in April and the controversial use of prisoners in
Europe constitute the darkest chapter of the American camp experience. However, as
prisoners' writings· show, these events did not detract from the genuinely positive
impression created by everyday life in the camps. Hans Albertson, who faced starvation
in Attichy, still became an American citizen. He writes that "Crossville remained a
respectable, fair and memorable experience in my life." Hermann Treis feels that his time
in Crossville "laid the basis for my love for the USA." Reflecting on his departure from
Tennessee, Edwin Pelz remembers that he had "felt at home there--! had never felt that
we were enemies. It was all like a dream and that is how it remains in my memory. I was
not ashamed of the tears which were running down my face that day as we all said our
goodbyes."53
On balance, camp life was obviously a positive episode in the lives of these
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German soldiers. They enjoyed enormous freedoms, and, in the words of Evelyn Coulter,
they decided to "make the most of a bad situation" by teaching, learning, competing, and
composing. Their active lifestyles, however, constituted only a portion of their fond
memories. As prisoners' recollections reveal, interactions with their captors were an
equally important feature of the POW experience. Those exchanges, and their greater
significance, are the focus of the next two chapters.
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Chapter 2
Through the Barbed Wire

Howard Newton of the 3 1 6th Military Police Battalion sat alone, manning his
guard tower. The sounds of laughter and revelry down below, typical of the evening
hours, seemed especially loud on this particular night. From his tower, Newton watched
as a barrack door flew open. A prisoner ran from the building, laughing, as several shoes
flew past him. Having decided it was time to settle the prisoners, Newton turned on the ·
tower's floodlight, moving it back and forth across the barrack. Several minutes of
silence passed. Finally, the door opened again, and Newton caught sight of an arm,
outstretched, waving a white handkerchief. He promptly turned off the floodlight.54
By and large, the Americans and Germans remained on their respective sides of
the barbed wire. The prisoners were free to manage their own affairs, while the guards
usually spent uneventful shifts along the fences and in the towers. While camps like
Crossville thus contained two virtually distinct worlds, the contacts that did take place
would have an important effect on the two groups' perceptions of each other. This
chapter will show that these interactions left most prisoners, guards, and local residents
with favorable views of each other. It is first necessary, however, to survey the unfriendly
episodes that did take place.
Arrogance and Nazism

Even after they arrived in American camps, a number of the Germans remained
confident of victory. Thanking his guards for the excellent food and living space, one
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German officer remarked, "When Germany wins the war, that will be at least one good
mark on your record." In a similar vein, some POWs would question the practicality of
studying English: "After the war's over, everybody is going to speak German here."55 In
Crossville, some collective acts of defiance took place, but they were generally mild.
Howard Newton, a guard, remembers that in 1943 the Germans
thought they were going to win the war. . .. All day long, they'd march backwards
and forwards in them steel boots. See each other, "Heil Hitler !" All day long.
That went on for a couple of months. They finally got tired of it, and began to
ease up. . . . They got lazy.
One year, refusing to celebrate Thanksgiving, some prisoners decided to save their turkey
until the following Sunday. The end result was an overfilled camp hospital on Monday
morning, thanks to the ample servings of four-day-old thawed turkey.56
In addition to such lighthearted episodes, some of Crossville's prisoners harbored
a more sincere hostility towards the United States. The best example is the leadership of
one of the most infamous German POWs, Captain Jurgen Wattenberg. Previously the
navigation officer of the battleship Graf Spee and the commander of the submarine U162, Wattenberg was one of the first officers to arrive at Camp Crossville in late 1942.
He became the prisoners' official spokesmen, despite the legal claim of a German colonel
to the position, and Major Cooper quickly came to view him as a dyed-in-the-wool Nazi.
This assumption was not unfounded, considering the naval officer's belief that "the
Fuehrer expects us to make trouble."57
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As spokesman, Wattenberg considered any acts of cooperation by his subordinates
to be treason. According to camp authorities' reports, he demanded that prisoners let him
censor their letters, and he threatened collaborators with capital punishment. He also
encouraged fellow prisoners to "pester" their guards by taunting them and running laps
around the stockade perimeter to confuse them. Such behavior eventually exhausted the
patience of Crossville's authorities, who began to request for his transfer as early as July
1943. Finally, in January 1944, he departed Crossville for Camp Papago Park, Arizona,
where he displayed similar behavior, and even organized the famous, if unsuccessful,
"Faustball Tunnel" escape. 58
Another such character was Major Friedrich Johannes Werner. A protestant
minister, Werner quickly annoyed camp officials with his fiery sermons. The following
excerpt, reported to the Camp Commander by William Kanning, the German chaplain,
demonstrates the hostile nature of the Major's message:
Today we hold the· Fortress of Europe against all the World. God did not give
Germany great riches in natural resources, but he did give her men who could
work and fight and make a rightful place for us in the sun. Germany is struggling
for her rightful amount of room in the world in which to live. She will never be
defeated, if she does not lose faith in her historical mission in the world.
It was not unusual for camp authorities to equate such nationalistic sentiments with
Nazism. Following a transfer request in October 1943 which accused him of doing "more
promoting for the State religion of Hitler than . . . for the Christian religion," Major
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Werner moved to Camp Alva, Oklahoma, a camp for the most ardent Nazis.59
For a time, Crossville's strain of prisoner hostility extended beyond the acts of a
few individuals. Because the American personnel generally stayed outside the stockade,
internal discipline was the responsibility of German noncommissioned officers, whom
American authorities permitted to dole out punishments for minor offenses within the
camp. But in the winter of 1944-45, the guards received several reports that the system
fostered a Nazi undercurrent.
The first indicator came in December, when a group of officer prisoners submitted
an anonymous letter to the Camp Commander, to protest the internal organization of their
camp. They reported that the camp spokesman, who was supposed to act as an
intermediary between prisoners and guards, actually assumed the role of a military
commander. The spokesman at the time, Rudolf Buhse, placed pro-Nazi officers in
charge of the press, the library, the curriculum, and in other roles. In some ways, they
said, this authoritarian system "even surpasse[d] conditions within Germany itself." By
socially isolating anti-Nazis and using death threats against them and their families, the
Nazi elements allegedly maintained control over the inmates. 60
Other reports emerged to corroborate these claims. Following an official
inspection of the camp in January 1945, which included interviews with prisoners,
Captain William F. Raugust concluded that the camp spokesman ruled in a "dictatorial
manner," using "courts of honor" to try anti-Nazis. Worse yet, he reported that POWs
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were "forced to remain in the mess halls after each evening meal while a distorted news
communique [was] read." A month later, a State Department inspection made the same
observations, and recommended action on the part of the Crossville officials. The camp
commander replied that he had solved the problem by sending Rudolf Buhse to Camp
Alva and appointing a new spokesman.6 1
Firsthand accounts by prisoners also suggest the presence of individual insurgents
within the POW population. Hermann Treis ordered a number of books by writers who
had been exiled from Germany, only to find that a superior officer had cancelled his
request. As Albertson remembers, when a German doctor in Camp Crossville learned
that his son was killed in action, he angrily condemned Hitler. A ranking German officer
summarily court-martialed him and forbade other officers to associate with him. 62 Worse
yet, a few even feared for their lives. In a letter to the camp commander, Eberhard van
Nuis, a known anti-Nazi, reported receiving a note on his doorstep "with the message that
my death was a matter of decision and that I had forfeited my life." Death threats
continued even after he had himself placed in protective custody, and he ultimately
received a transfer to another camp.63
In some camps, Nazi "discipline" turned violent. At night, collaborators might
receive visits by the "Holy Ghost," meaning that they would be held to their beds and .
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beaten.64 In Camp Aliceville, Alabama, guards intervened to prevent the lynching of a
German communist. Worse still was the lot of Werner Drechsler, an informant for the
camp officials who was beaten to death in Papago Park, Arizona, or a prisoner in Hearne,
Texas who met the same fate. As of May 1944, the PMGO officially recorded seven
politically-motivated murders in the camp system. 65 None of these murders took place in
Crossville, although one lucky prisoner allegedly received a transfer just as "the knife was
sharpened. "66
Each facility also had its share of avowed anti-Nazis. Among this group were a
number of communists and socialists, some of whom seemed to be as mistrustful of the
Americans as they were of the Nazis. Others were non-Germans, whom the Reich
conscripted from occupied territories. Several of these prisoners, whose ranks included
French, Austrian, Polish, Czech, and Russian citizens, asked not only to be paroled, but to
fight for the Allies. A letter from Otto Wunsch, an Austrian interned in Crossville, to the
Provost Marshal General is representative of these requests:
I am an Austrian, my father has been at a Nazi concentration camp for half a year.
Therefore, you will understand that I have nothing [in] common with these
people. On the contrary, I want to have a share for the liberation of my
homeland. . .. I hope a similar institution as the Austrian Legion [which] the
British now have in Italy will be created in this country. Many Austrian prisoners
would be glad to see an end of their idleness in the camp and to be able to do
something for their country.
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In its response to Wunsch and others, the Provost Marshal General's Office explained
that the best way to help the Allies was "to cooperate wholeheartedly with the present
prisoner of war work program." If such prisoners felt endangered, they could request a
transfer to another camp, as with Eberhard van Nuis, described above. 67
The standard means of combating political intimidation was to create separate
facilities for anti-Nazis, and to send hostile prisoners to Camp Alva, Oklahoma. This
procedure was deceptively simple, however. For one thing, removing German
spokesmen automatically brought protests through the Swiss legation, the ultimate effect
of which was additional paperwork for camp commanders. There was also the problem
of distinguishing between hardened Nazis and merely uncooperative prisoners, not to
mention the inability to determine which prisoners were causing the problems. For these
reasons, the removal of agitators remained, in the words of Edward Pluth, "the War
Department's albatross. "68
Open Hostility and the "Battle of Crossville"

Within the nationwide system, some violence did occur between Germans and
Americans. The worst incident took place on the night of 8-9 July, 1 945, in Camp Salina,
Utah. During the night, Clarence Bertucci, a guard at the camp, suddenly began to fire
his tower's machine gun into the group of tents that housed the German POWs, killing
nine and wounding nineteen. The shooter explained that he disliked Germans, and that he
· had acted on a long-standing temptation. Camp authorities advocated a court-martial, but
67
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Bertucci was ultimately ruled insane and confined to a mental institution. 69 It is worth
emphasizing that this incident, by far the worst that took place in the American camps,
was the result of individual derangement, not official policy.
While no event at Crossville rivals the violence at Salina, there was one instance
of violence, which Herston Cooper refers to as the "Battle of Crossville." In February
1943, during a routine "property check" in which guards searched prisoners' quarters for
contraband and signs of escape plots, a group of officers refused to move to the recreation
field, as was the normal procedure. According to Cooper, Captain Wattenberg, the acting
spokesman at that time, refused to relay the guards' orders because he hoped to provoke
an uprising to embarrass his captors. Eventually an armed guard advanced, bayonets
fixed, and compelled the prisoners to vacate.
Later in the day, several prisoners rushed Cooper, and one prisoner, Major Erich
Graf, placed him in a "painful 'hammer lock. "' Cooper remembers kicking at Graf with
his steel-rimmed boots, as other guards came to his aid. At some point in the scuffle,
Graf received a bayonet wound, and was sent to the hospital. According to both Major
Cooper and Howard Newton, Graf resisted treatment in the hospital, telling the American
doctor that "he wanted to die for his Fuhrer in the battle of Crossville." Frustrated by the
prisoner's struggling, the doctor elected to "let him die, then, if he wants to die."70
Within a few hours, Graf' s wish became a reality.
The incident's aftermath caused a confrontation of a different sort. According to
69
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Army regulations, POWs who died while interned were entitled to an honorable burial.
Graf s funeral, which all of the German officers attended, featured a large Iron Cross and
a Nazi flag. After the ceremony, officials arranged for Graf to be buried in the local
cemetery, a fact that did not sit well with the community. Crossville Mayor Charles
Smith led a group of angry citizens to the camp to protest the burial in their cemetery. If
the camp commander did not remove Graf, the group warned, they would "dig him up
and hang him on Main Street." With little delay, the commander had Graf's remains
disinterred, reburied inside the camp, and eventually transferred to a site at Camp Forrest
in Tullahoma.7 1
While unfortunate, the events surrounding the "Battle of Crossville" were
unrepresentative of life at the camp. Citizens' indignation over Graf's burial stands in
sharp relief to their general acceptance of the camp's presence, as well as their benign
relationships with prisoners, as will be seen later. More importantly, the scene of mass
hostility remains an isolated incident in the story of a generally uneventful day-to-day
camp life. The following section will demonstrate that, even in cases of disobedience, the
prisoners were generally harmless.
Escapes and Minor Offenses

Some of the most interesting interactions between civilians and prisoners were the
result of escapes. Writing in the April 1944 issue of American Magazine, FBI director J.
Edgar Hoover admonished Americans to remain on the lookout for escapees. The
frustrated director presented several true stories in which unobservant citizens aided
71
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German fugitives, such as an unknowing G.I. who bought drinks for a German fugitive in
Nashville, or an elderly couple who gave an escapee a free night's lodging. Prisoners'
slip-ups usually brought them back into the hands of authorities, but Hoover warned
civilians to be vigilant for clever disguises and tactics. 72
The public's help was crucial, Hoover stressed, because escapees were obviously
rabid Nazis. Although none had committed acts of sabotage, he argued, "they might
have." The FBI director believed that "every one of these . . . prisoners at one time or
another broods upon his confinement and tries to figure out some means of escaping."
After all, since "every prisoner of war has taken an oath to uphold the forces of Nazism
and Fascism," they would seek to continue the war at all costs.73
Despite the director's assurances, an examination of escape stories shows that
fugitive prisoners were completely harmless. As even Hoover conceded, none of the
escapees actually committed acts of violence or sabotage. Nor, in most cases, did they
travel very far. The Provost Marshal General himself referred to them as "absentees,"
rather than "escapees," because they generally spent a few days dawdling in the
surrounding area, before surrendering or being captured. In the most famous escape, the
digging of the "Faustball Tunnel" at Papago Park, Arizona, all of the prisoners were back
in the camp almost immediately, after a brief taste of freedom. Captain Jurgen
Wattenberg was the last to be captured: he turned himself in to a police officer in
downtown Phoenix after less than a month.74
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The escape stories reflect a simple desire to relieve the monotony of camp life.
Four prisoners who escaped from a train in Kansas stole several cars in making their
escape, leading police on a high speed chase through the eastern part of the state. When
police finally caught them and returned them to camp, a photographer who snapped a
picture of them remarked that their actions served as proof of the Germans' "unsubdued
belligerence." However, the four smiling faces in the picture imply that the real
motivation behind the escape was the excitement of the adventure itself.75
Camp Crossville's sole escapee was equally innocuous. On Saturday, October 23,
1943, camp authorities first became aware of the absence of Captain Wolfgang
Hellfritsch. After hiding in a garbage truck as it left the camp, Hellfritsch began
hitchhiking, and allegedly even rode with a highway patrolman who had his photograph
on the dashboard.76 By the end of the following week his picture appeared on the front
page of the Nashville Tennessean, with a report that he had been seen jumping from a
train bound for Ohio. Other papers across the state also gave his description and warned
residents to be on the lookout. After four months, on February 18, 1944, the FBI finally
caught up to Hellfritsch, who had been working for some time on a farm near Lexington,
Kentucky. 77 As with the other escape cases, Hellfritsch does not seem to have had any
persistent desire to wage war on the United States. Escapes were an inconvenience for
camp personnel, but they did not pose a security threat.
As with escapes, most forms of misbehavior lacked any political or military
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motive. American officials even viewed some displays of Nazi symbols as pranks, rather
than as serious statements. In Crossville, a few German gardeners planted seeds in such a
pattern that, after a period of rainy weather, a swastika became clearly visible in the grass.
Colonel Harry Dudley, the camp commander, dismissed the incident as a simple prank
and imposed no punishments on the amused prisoners. In a similar case in Arizona, a
group of German workers on their way to a work site unfurled a Nazi flag and hung it on
the back of a truck, out of view of the driver. While authorities did punish the offenders,
they viewed the act as a practical joke.78
When observing the prisoners' rebelliousness, one must remember that most of
them were in their late teens or early twenties. As the Provost Marshal General explained
to the press, "any group of young men . . . will try to raise all the Hell they can with
somebody who is over them, to keep them in a dither all the time." Reflecting on his own
rambunctious behavior and "heavy drinking" as a POW, Gerhard Hennes compares his
actions to those of the average college student. After all, he "was the same age [ as an
undergraduate]. I was twenty-one when I came to Crossville, and so we had plenty of
beer, and . . . there was no curfew."79 In such an atmosphere, one could reasonably expect
a certain degree of unruly behavior.
Young, lighthearted, and curious, the majority of the prisoners did not harbor any
great malice toward their captors. They focused on their daily work and activities and
paid little attention to the American soldiers. The fact that a single guard, armed only
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with a pistol, could enter the compound and not even attract the attention of the prisoners
is a testament to the Germans' docility. 80 American authorities not only recognized this
docility, but in fact cultivated it, and turned it to their advantage.
American Policy and "Coddling"

The Provost Marshal General's Office made sure that the POWs were by no
means "roughing it." For example, most prisoners fondly recall the large and diverse
camp menus, as described in Chapter 1. Even despite prisoners' appetites, Hennes recalls
that meals could produce several garbage cans of uneaten food. 81 Especially interesting
was the fact that Crossville prisoners had access to beer, which even local residents could
not buy. Many Afrikakorps soldiers, who had become accustomed to meager rations,
actually became sick from their abundant and rich diet in camp. It is no wonder that
American civilians, on learning of the prisoners' heavy diets and access to consumer
items, began to see them as spoiled. 82
After a while, the German and Italian prisoners in Crossville even began to act
spoiled, as shown by their demands and complaints to camp authorities. Officers
complained about the unattentiveness of their enlisted valets. Demands for pets--which
were sometimes approved--included requests for a dog, a monkey, and a canary. The
Italian officers asked for partitions in the showers and the right to take baths, but the
stockade commander drew the line when they requested individual nameplates on the
partitions. An increase in the beer allowance, phonographs, short-wave radios, a
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swimming pool, and interactions with women were also among the prisoners' denied
requests. 83
This level of comfort and laxity was not unique to Crossville. Throughout the
country, prisoners enjoyed traveling in passenger trains, and a few even ordered from
waiters in Pullman cars. One Italian prisoner recalls receiving three meals a day on his
train journey, while his guards only had two. Later, after Mussolini's fall, Italian POWs
received even more privileges, because technically they were no longer enemies. Italians
in camps near large cities sometimes received permission to go sightseeing, and often
attended dances and dinners in local Italian-American communities. 84
As these conditions became public know_ledge, and as news of harsh treatment of
American POWs in Germany reached the U.S., the public lashed out at the Army for
"coddling" enemy prisoners. A Newsweek article in May 1945 juxtaposed accounts from
German and American POW camps to show that the average American POW in Germany
lost an unhealthy amount of weight, while the average German POW in America often
gained weight after capture. The article also noted that, as American POWs were telling

their liberators about thousand-mile forced marches, the German prisoners were openly
celebrating Hitler's birthday. Around the same time, journalist Walter Winchell launched
a series of attacks on camp authorities. In his radio broadcasts, Winchell relayed various
reports of "coddling," including off-site dentist visits, hearing aids, pajamas, and other
luxuries. "The way we coddle Nazi prisoners," he remarked, "explains why the Germans
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laugh and call ours ... Dumocracy." Over time, these protests would only increase. 85
The loudest objections often came when prisoners received better treatment than
Americans. In Crossville, during a beer shortage, guards became frustrated to learn that
because the officer prisoners "outrank our soldiers, . . . they get the beer." At a camp in
New Jersey, the commander summarily cut butter supplies for prisoners when his wife
complained about a shortage of the commodity. An irritated Newsweek reporter listed off
foods on prisoners' menus, such as veal and pork chops, which many civilians could not
have afforded. In the face of such reports, it was difficult for Americans to accept their
own sacrifices. 86
Especially offended were African-Americans, who contrasted their own treatment
with that of the POWs. The most famous incident came in January 1945, when singer
Lena Horne walked out of. a USO show in Little Rock, Arkansas. Horne had become
outraged when the "rude and definitely unfriendly" commander admitted German
prisoners, but not black troops, to the theater. Countless similar instances took place
throughout the war, such as the removal of blacks from train cars to make way for
German and Italian prisoners. In one case, German POWs at MacDill Field, Florida
actually requested, and received, segregation of the hospital cafeteria. "Nothing so
lowers Negro morale," observed the editor of The Crisis, "as the frequent preferential
treatment of Axis prisoners of war. "87
Eventually, this frustration escalated to the point of violence. On August 14,
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1944, a group of black soldiers in Fort Lawton, Washington rioted and attacked a
company of Italian prisoners, killing a private. In November, as the Army began court
martial proceedings for forty-three of the soldiers, a writer for The Crisis suggested that
the attack was "the only way to focus American public opinion upon [the soldiers']
unhappy plight." While this was not "justification for mob action," the writer argued, it
demonstrated that black Americans "had reached the breaking point. They could no
longer endure seeing prisoners of war . . . enjoy in this country the very facilities which
they were denied." The Courier noted that white soldiers, also annoyed with the
"coddling," had conducted a similar attack the night before the riot, and that the black
soldiers had simply "picked up the ball."88 Like a growing number of civilians, these
soldiers demanded an explanation for POWs' comfortable lifestyles.
An important element of camp authorities' defense was the clarification of
misunderstandings. For example, citizens of Cumberland County raised questions about
the Maidens United For Fun Service (MUFFS), an organization that provided
entertainment for the guards and personnel at Camp Crossville. The camp's public
relations office released a statement to dispel the rumor that the MUFFS were actually
dancing with the German internees.89 Officials also repeatedly explained that the Italians,
whose government had surrendered, had been reclassified as "co-belligerents," and
enjoyed additional privileges. Colonel Francis Howard of the Army POW Division wrote
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to a complainant that these Italians, who were "in sympathy with the Allied cause," had
joined Italian Service Units to aid the American war effort, and subsequently they were
"afforded minor privileges."90
Eventually, the public outcry led to an investigation by the House Military Affairs
Committee, to determine whether prisoners were truly being "coddled." In the
proceedings, covered extensively by the New York Times, the Committee found that many
civilian complaints about extravagant privileges, such as "parties, picnics, dances . . .
[and] sightseeing tours," were based on rumors.9 1 In terms of the food levels, the
Committee stressed that the Provost Marshal General merely adhered to the standards of
the Geneva Convention. Article 11 of the agreement dictated that POWs' food levels
must be the same as those of the captor nation's soldiers. Consequently, the Germans
received an estimated 3,560 calories, as compared to 3,800 for American G.l.s.92
After defending the PMGO on these grounds, the Committee went on to question
the credibility of the protesters: "The conclusion is inescapable that any complaints of
laxity in our control and treatment of war prisoners come from persons who have never
heard of that state document [the Geneva Convention] and are therefore unaware of its
definite provisions." It found the remainder of the complaints to be from "persons in
more obscure walks of life; people who were prejudiced because they were generally
bitter to begin with and who would form opinions and perpetuate stories without
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bothering to ascertain the facts."93
Officials at other levels also gave practical reasons for comfortable treatment. At
Camp Crossville, Herston Cooper believed that Nazism was best met with responses
fitting a "civilized and honorable" country. By treating the prisoners respectfully, Cooper
believed, the Nazis among them might "be convinced of the pseudo properties of their
persuasion." The Provost Marshal General, Major General Archer Lerch, emphasized
that "any non-adherence by this government probably would result in instant retaliation
against American prisoners held in Germany." He said that camps in Germany generally
operated within the confines of international law. Recent hardships for American POWs
were the result of the "internal crackup" of Germany, not a renunciation of the Geneva
Convention, and therefore the document's provisions were sti11 in effect. 94
The most effective practical arguments for American treatment of POWs are
clearly outlined in a speech by Lieutenant Newton Margulies, the Assistant Judge
Advocate, at Jefferson Barracks in Missouri. Addressing an audience in April 1945,
Margulies listed the three primary reasons for POWs' treatment. First, he explained that
news of POWs' treatment reached the German lines, where more prisoners might be
enticed to surrender. In his words, it was thus "eminently more sensible, and really more
clever, to win our war with butter and beefsteaks instead of bullets and bombs." This
argument seems valid, especially considering the fact that an estimated eighty to ninety
percent of German POWs interrogated in Europe revealed that they anticipated good
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Second, Margulies said that humane treatment kept the Germans docile and cut
down on security needs. He attributed the low number of escapes, and the complete
absence of sabotage, to "the fact that the prisoners are relatively happy in the camps."
Indeed, despite the use of prisoners outside camps and the laxness of guards, the POW
escape rate was .45%, as compared to .44% in the federal prison system. The prisoners,
occupied with beer, sports, and classes, generally thought little about harassment or
escape.96
Finally, the speaker explained that allowing the prisoners jobs outside the camps
filled the manpower shortage, and controlled them through monetary incentives. By
offering payment for work, camp authorities fostered the abandonment of Nazi ideals, and
watched as "the Nazi sniper became the American farmer!"97 Prisoners focused their
time and energy on working for canteen credit, while actually aiding the American
economy. Indeed, as explained in Chapter 1, one year's POW labor brought $80 million
in improvements to military installations, and contract work contributed $20 million
toward the maintenance cost of the camp system. 98
While it provoked some resentment among American citizens, in practical terms
the policy of good treatment was a sensible one. In addition to fulfilling the requirements
of the Geneva Convention, this so-called "coddling" helped to pacify prisoners.
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Moreover, in a time of insatiable demands on labor, it reduced the number of guards
needed, while adding cooperative workers to the labor pool. Just as important as this
official effort, however, were the interactions between Americans and Germans in
everyday life. The positive impressions created through the barbed wire would last well
beyond repatriation.
Benevolence and Fraternization

Initially, there was an air of tension in contacts between Americans and Germans.
In 1942, authorities usually arranged for incoming prisoners to arrive at Crossville in the
evening, to avoid drawing a crowd and a potential confrontation. When civilians did see
the prisoners, however, they seemed nervous, but far from hostile. Occasionally,
residents of Cumberland County would gather near groups of German laborers,
displaying a guarded curiosity. Evelyn Coulter, a clerical worker in the camp hospital,
remembers that townspeople "really didn't know what to say" when prisoners came
through downtown Crossville, but that they "did a lot of staring." According to Edward
Pluth, this interest in the prisoners was quite common nationwide: Americans, he says,
were typically "more inquisitive than antagonistic when actually confronted with the
German soldier."99
Over time, civilians' caution abated, and they became increasingly friendly toward
the prisoners. One prisoner in Colorado recalls that civilian employers brought him food,
and even invited him to their homes, although his guards prevented such visits. Evelyn
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Coulter recalls having pleasant conversations with German doctors and with Heinz
Muller, the German interpreter in the hospital. These interactions, Coulter says, directly
influenced her lifelong admiration for the German people. Even despite the state of war
and the news of German atrocities, some Americans were able to cultivate friendships
with their purported enemies. 1 00
This amiable relationship sometimes troubled American authorities, especially in
terms of fraternization between women and the German prisoners. The Provost Marshal
General publicly acknowledged only one instance of women cavorting with prisoners, but
studies of the camps suggest otherwise. Allan Kent Powell has recorded several cases of
"illicit sexual relations" in Utah, and Judith Gansberg tells the story of an escapee who
lived with a California woman for a month before being recaptured. Similar events
apparently occurred in the Southeast, too, as suggested by a number of exhortations from
the Fourth Service Command. In November 1944, the Armed Service Forces
headquarters in Atlanta ordered the use of "partitions, rails, fences, or similar means [in
work areas] so that fraternization between prisoners of war and female personnel will be
prevented." A month later, presumably because of continued violations, the command
headquarters reiterated the order, asking camp authorities to take "positive means" to
stamp out fraternization, and to directly report all transgressions. Yet again in March
1945, the command responded to reports of such interactions, ordering the cancellation of
contracts with any employers who failed to prevent socialization with civilians. 1 0 1
1 00
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Guards, too, developed friendships with their charges. Allen Koop; writing on a
camp in New Hampshire, describes how American soldiers sometimes helped prisoners
to finish their work, so that both could return to the barracks more quickly. Koop says
that many such friendships formed because Americans and Germans found common
ground in "shirking, as well as working." In Crossville and elsewhere, prisoners
sometimes covered for sleeping guards. Hans Albertson, for example, often promised to
wake his napping supervisor if an inspection party approached. In another instance,
American firemen and German prisoners worked out a small moneymaking scheme. As
Herman Treis recalls,
A fireman sat down with us and developed the following plan. I was to make sure
that the stove in my barrack was stoked excessively so that a small flame would
be visible above the roof. Then the guard from the watch tower would call the fire
alarm and they, the firemen, would receive a so-called action bonus. That winter
we were the cause of several fire alarms.
For their part, guards overlooked prisoners' idleness, allowing them to work
halfheartedly, or gave them small gifts. 1 02
Like civilians, guards received reprimands from their superiors for excessive
socialization with the prisoners. As early as December 1 943, the commander at Camp
Forrest, Tennessee responded to reports of fraternization and trading between guards and
POWs. The headquarters issued a memo to remind personnel that "these men are
Prisoners of War, and will be treated as such." The memo forbade the giving of
cigarettes, candy, gum, and "unauthorized articles" to the Germans, and prohibited the
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acceptance of gifts from them. 1 03 Even without an official policy of good treatment-
indeed, well beyond the provisions of the policy--the American soldiers befriended the
Germans.
At Crossville, another positive influence was the benevolence of Colonel Harry
Dudley, who served as the camp commander after August 1943. According to Hans
Albertson, prisoners respected the Colonel, because he "reacted favorably to many
German requests and suggestions," and allowed the prisoners a degree of self-governance.
He frequently supported prisoners' initiatives, such as the prisoner-run garden and the
fine arts exhibition described in Chapter 1. The commander even befriended a few
prisoners, including Albertson, who "had some quite interesting dialog with him every
week and smoked his offered cigars with enjoyment." Hermann Treis, who served the
American officers breakfast, also engaged in countless conversations with the Colonel,
whom he describes as a "fatherly figure." Dudley even secured a transfer for Treis, so
that he could see more of the U.S. while in transit. 1 04
Even camp inspectors were aware of Dudley's positive influence on guard
prisoner relations. After attending the fine arts exhibition, inspector Edouard Patte saw
the event as a testament to the commander's "understanding leadership." After viewing
the camp in April 1944, State Department representative Bernard Gufler reported that
Crossville displayed "an outstandingly good feeling and spirit of cooperation between the
prisoners and the camp administration." He noted that this atmosphere only developed
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after Dudley's appointment as commander the previous August . 1 05 Like the prisoners,
American officials appreciated the Colonel' s contribution to camp harmony.
Combined with the ample food and relative freedom, the numerous instances of
positive interactions with their captors gave the German prisoners a positive impression
of American citizens and their society. Prisoners' memories were so favorable that many
of them, including Hennes and Albertson, moved to America after the war, and countless
others returned to visit the camp in later years. If the policy of good treatment aided the
war effort, this sense of American benevolence would also help to mend postwar
German-American relations, as the next chapter will demonstrate.
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Chapter 3
Denazification and the German POW

After visiting the Papago Park camp in April 1 945, Democratic Congressman
Richard F. Harless of Arizona was outraged. He simply could not countenance the fact
that his state housed "pampered, well-fed German prisoners as fat as hogs." Not only did
they live in luxury, he said, but the prisoners were under the control of "old guard
German sergeants" who continued to uphold National Socialism. Harless charged that
"the United States has not done a single thing to educate German prisoners in the
American way of life," and demanded immediate action. 106 Unbeknownst to the
congressman, however, the government had already begun such a program.
During the war, American authorities had discussed possible methods of
"denazification," to root out all facets of National Socialism in postwar Germany.
Officially, the term referred to an effort to remove and punish Nazi civil servants in
occupied Germany. But in 1 944, the PMGO launched a new program, the "reeducation"
of POWs in the U.S., to assist in reforming the German ideology. As such, the Special
Projects Division (SPD) program fits within the greater denazification effort.
The term "denazification" is problematic, because it assumes, as did many
Americans at the time, that all nationalistic Germans were Nazis. Indeed, one of the
Swiss legation's common complaints to the State Department was that camp staff labeled
all uncooperative Germans as Nazis, regardless of their political views. 1 07 For the
purpose of this study, the term will denote the effort to prevent a resurgence of
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totalitarianism and aggression in Germany. This chapter will assess America's
contribution to that effort.
Denazification as Punishment

The most prominent form of denazification was the effort to root out and punish
Nazi officials after 1 945. This effort, in the eyes of many, was a failure. In
Denazification (1 969), Constantine Fitzgibbon charges that America and Britain initially
"rubbed [Germans' noses] in the Nazi filth," but ultimately failed to follow through with
meaningful policies. 1 08 He defines three clear goals within American denazification:
punishment of war criminals, a "cleansing" of Germany's administrative ranks, and
ideological reeducation. After evaluating the American pursuit of these goals, he
contends that the plan's only real effect was resentment among the Germans.
The main problem with prosecuting Nazis was the question of whom to charge.
Fitzgibbon argues that American policy was initially overzealous, as it attempted to "sift
the entire adult population into Nazis and non-Nazis." Authorities distributed thirteen
million Fragebogen, or questionnaires, to the population, to determine which citizens
actively supported the Nazism and war crimes. The result was a logistical nightmare, as
thousands of staffers attempted to make sense of varied answers and attitudes. When the
trials began, amnesties, inconsistent sentences, and painfully slow hearings undermined
the credibility of the process, leaving Germans skeptical of what they saw as a "quasi
9

legal, bureaucratic apparatus." 1 0
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According to Fitzgibbon, the administrative cleansing policy also met strong
criticism. Drawing on the experiences of their Union Army counterparts in 1865,
American officials decided that a stable government and economy would not be possible
if they removed wartime civie and business leaders. But by leaving these leaders in
power and banning minor officials from holding civic office, the Military Government
lent its policy an air of injustice. Germans could not take seriously an authority that
pardoned major leaders while prosecuting those it considered "lesser offenders." 1 1 0
Ultimately, Fitzgibbon explains, contradictions in denazification policy only
fostered cynicism among the German people. Critics pointed to the irony of a
"democratic" authority that governed by decree and through a military presence. Others
questioned the prosecution of individuals, when the victors professed to believe in
"collective responsibility." Combined with controversial legal procedures, these
contradictions further depleted the credibility of denazification. In the end, Fitzgibbon
concludes, the effort failed to punish the guilty, to evoke feelings of guilt in the public, or
to instill Germans with an appreciation of democracy. 1 1 I
At best, the punitive strategy was incomplete. On the other side of the Atlantic,
however, a growing number of officials saw the potential for reform among the 372,000
German prisoners of war. It seemed only logical to bring the ideological battle to the
camp system, and, in the SPD's words, pursue a policy of "reeducation."
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The Special Projects Division

As early as the summer of 1 943, the Provost Marshal General's Office had drafted
plans for a plan to combat Nazi indoctrination among the German prisoners. The plan
remained inactive, however, until the idea of a reeducation program caught the attention
of Eleanor Roosevelt in March 1 944. The First Lady appealed to both Secretary of State
Cordell Hull and War Secretary Henry Stimson, who agreed on the need for a secret
"reorientation" program, with the goal of "imbuing [German prisoners] with respect for
the quality of American institutions." The program was to be conducted both subtly and
quietly, for two reasons. First, officials knew that "an obvious campaign . . . to tum the
prisoners against their own country'' would only cause "dissension in the camps and . . .
lead the prisoners to react directly against this country." Second, as Ron Robin explains,
the U.S. would have to avoid "blatant defiance" of international law, which prohibited the
indoctrination of prisoners. The appearance of an indoctrination program might compel
the Germans to retaliate by "reorienting" American prisoners in Germany. To avoid any
such interpretation, officials classified the effort as an "Intellectual Diversion" program.
The details of the plan would remain confidential until the end of the war, and the Provost
Marshal General would refuse to answer reporters' questions about the program. 1 1 2
The reeducation program became the task of the Special Projects Division (SPD),
under the Provost Marshal General. Led by Colonel Edward Davison, the program
comprised three major tasks: Project I, the distribution of pro-democracy reading material
1 12
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to POWs; Project II, the training of civil administrators for postwar Germany; and Project
ill, the formation of a school for German police officers. After the war, Davison added
the "Six-Day Bicycle Race," a crash course in American democracy, in a last-ditch effort
to educate as many cooperative German prisoners as possible before repatriation.
Conducted in early 1 946 at Fort Eustis, Virginia, the program graduated 23, 142 POWs
before its closing in April. 1 1 3 Unfortunately, as a review of these ambitious plans
demonstrates, the SPD's projects seem to have suffered from a number of problems.
Project I, known as the "Idea Factory," began in Camp Van Etten, New York, in
October 1 944. The Factory's staff included a mix of American intellectuals, German
refugees, and volunteers from within the POW population. Their primary goal was the
publication of Der Ruf ("The Call"), a pro-democracy magazine to be distributed
throughout the nation's camps. In addition, Factory members screened and reviewed
films, books, and reading material for distribution throughout the camp system. The SPD
also placed AssistantExecutive Officers at each camp, to aid camp commanders in
carrying out reeducation programs and to introduce pro-democracy educational material
into camp curricula. 1 1 4
Unfortunately, educational efforts ran into several problems. First, many camp
commanders remained unconvinced of the efficacy of a reeducation program, and saw the
Assistant Executive Officers as "a threat to camp harmony." Likewise, many reeducation
officials resented the uncooperativeness of local commanders. Even at Camp Van Etten,
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the heart of the program, Factory members complained that the commander treated the
German staff as if they were "prisoners in a strictly Nazi [POW] camp." Furthermore, a
continued emphasis on the labor program limited the time and resources for the education
programs. 1 1 s
A second problem with Project I was the nature of Der Ruf From January 1945
to April 1 946, the prisoner-run magazine reached a readership of 75,000, but it had its
share of opponents. Despite administrative assurances, some prisoners saw the
publication as a propagandistic mouthpiece, and doubted whether German prisoners
actually served on the staff. In extreme cases, hostile prisoners burned copies of Der Ruf,
charging its editors with collaboration. The most common problem, however, was a
perception of the German writers as an "alienated intelligentsia," who had little in
common with the average prisoner. As Robin explains, Der Ruf s content, which dealt
largely with literature, seemed centered around "private intellectual controversies," rather
than on issues pertinent to the average German soldier. To support this assertion, one can
simply examine accounts of ex-POWs. In an oral history of German prisoners in the
Southwest, Frederick Doyle failed to locate a single prisoner who remembered--or
admitted-reading Der Ruf At Crossville, neither Hans Albertson, Gerhard Hennes, nor
Hugo Hohnecker recalls the publication. 1 16 Either because of contempt or genuine
unawareness, it seems that Der Ruf did not have the intended impact on these prisoners.
Projects II and ill had similar obstacles in their efforts to install trained democratic
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officials in the new Germany. According to Arthur Smith, only about 600 of the 1,600
Project II graduates became civil officials after being repatriated. One reason for this low
proportion was the attitude of the American Military Government in Germany, especially
its head, General Lucius Clay. Opposed to the idea of creating a "privileged class" out of
the reeducated prisoners, Clay and other officials refused to give the Project II graduates
any special consideration in administrative positions, leaving them to join regular
applicant pools. Another impediment was the nature of German society after the war.
Smith points out that not all of the German soldiers wanted jobs in the Military
Government, for fear of being seen as collaborators with the occupiers. Others became
disillusioned by the American authorities in Germany, citing the irony of democratizing a
country through martial decrees. · Even Der Ruf, which began publication in Germany in
August 1946, became critical of the Military Government. 1 17 As with resistance in the
United States, administrative obstacles in Germany clearly hamstrung the SPD's efforts.
To what extent, despite these obstacles, was the Special Projects Division
successful in reeducating the general POW population? In the view of the SPD, the
reeducation program met "greater success . . . than the officers who administered the
program had dared to hope." In an effort to measure the program's success, authorities
conducted an opinion poll among approximately 25,000 departing German prisoners.
The study relied mainly on a pool of 22, 153 prisoners at the Camp Shanks, New York
port of embarkation. Because this pool represented Germans from within all service
commands, and camps with booth cooperative and obstinate commanders, it was
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considered to be a population of "average" prisoners. The SPD also polled a sampling of
graduates from the "Bicycle Race" reeducation program at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and a
group of prisoners in Atlanta, Nebraska, at a "normal, good prisoner of war camp." 1 1 8
In its report on the results, the SPD found prisoners' attitudes in general to be
"very favorable." 1 19 Asked whether the state exists to serve the people, or vice versa,
96% at Fort Eustis, 80% at Camp Atlanta, and 78% at Camp Shanks chose the former.
As for their preferred type of government, democracy was the choice of 96% at Fort
Eustis, and 62% at Camp Shanks. 1 20 Asked if they would fight the same war over again
if victory were assured, 98% at Fort Eustis, 89% at Camp Atlanta, and 76% at Camp
Shanks answered "No."
The report did find some responses to be "disappointing," however. Asked
whether the concentration camp films they had seen were real or propaganda, 94% at Fort
Eustis considered them to be real, but "average" prisoners at Camp Shanks were split
evenly among the answers "True," "Propaganda," and "No Answer." The study concedes
that the films could be both factual and propagandistic, but it attributes the results to a
"guilt complex" among prisoners. More disturbing was the fact that 57% of those at
Camp Shanks believed that, in whole or in part, "the Jews were the cause of Germany's
troubles." This suggests a racism which, the study says, "runs parallel to the experience
of our own nation." 1 2 1 Despite these disheartening answers, however, the report still
1 18
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claims overall victory in instilling the prisoners with democracy.
Unfortunately, several factors obscure the poll's results. Ron Robin asserts that
many prisoners probably gave what they knew would be "favorable" answers. He cites a
1946 survey of German youth, which argues that the youth were still ingrained with
totalitarianism. As a result, they simply tried to regurgitate the answers they believed to
be "correct," or desired. This, Robin says, explains the ambivalent answers about the
Jews. Prisoners were unsure which response their captors wanted, whereas questions
pertaining to government type were more clear-cut. He also suggests that, even if
prisoners were not "brainwashed," some probably saw "correct" answers as an express
ticket home. Either way, he says, the poll is unreliable. 1 22
The SPD, on the other hand, was confident in the accuracy of the results. It
expressed confidence that the answers were genuine, pointing out that even the most
favorable write-ins often had "unfavorable qualifications." Because some of the write-in
answers "could be extremely damaging to the writer if his identity were known," the
report said, POWs clearly took advantage of anonymity to express their true opinions. 1 23
In reality, the results of the survey are probably a mix of genuine and calculated answers
whose exact proportion is impossible to quantify.
The SPD poll probably did provide an approximation of prisoners' sentiments, but
it remains unclear whether the favorable answers were the result of reeducation.
Authorities had only admitted "cooperative" prisoners to the Eustis program, many of

122

The study cited by Robin is Donald McGranahan and Morris Janowitz, "Studies of German Youth,"

Journal ofAbnormal and Social Psychology 41 (January, 1946), and is summarized in Robin, 163-4.
123

"Poll of German Prisoner of War Opinion."

59

whom were probably partial to democracy at the outset. In the absence of pre-captivity
polling data, the percentages from Fort Eustis say little about the success of the "Bicycle
Race." Furthermore, if one assumes that an ideological shift did take place among the
POWs, the survey does not prove that the conversions were the result of the deliberate
educational effort. In fact, several other aspects of their time in captivity probably
swayed the prisoners from Nazism, as will be seen later in this chapter.
Despite the SPD' s own assertions of victory, its program obviously had several
flaws, and its ideological effect on the POWs is uncertain. But one must account for the
fact that, after 1945, Nazism was, for all intents and purposes, a dead ideology, and that
Germany did rejoin the Western democratic world. To understand the role of captivity in
this process, one must examine the other forces acting on the prisoners.
De-education

In the January 13, 1945 issue of the Saturday Evening Post, reporter Ernest
Hauser presented an account of his experiences with German prisoners in Europe. 1 24
Having emigrated from Germany to the United States before the war, Hauser won the
trust of countless POWs, who shared with him their views of Nazism, America, and the
war. According to Hauser, the average German soldier tended to be well-educated, and
intelligent enough to realize that Germany was losing. The frequent scenes of marching
and singing were only a fa�ade, and most prisoners tended to be rather sullen in
individual conversations. After all, he quipped, they were experiencing a "morning-after
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mood, rubbing their temples after the biggest binge in history." 1 25
The most striking part of the report is Hauser's discussion of the prisoners'
general disavowal of Nazism. As one prisoner told him, "They are all shedding their
Nazi ideas while things are going bad . . .. What's the use of being a Nazi when you are
q.efeated?" Adopting this point of view himself, Hauser concluded that "there is no such
thing as a defeated Nazi. Perhaps the Nazi philosophy is a state of mind which has to be
kept up with strong daily doses of victory." Were the war to shift in the Germans' favor,
"most of [the prisoners] would again be supermen with wings." 1 26
If one interprets Hauser's definition of "Nazism" as any display of nationalism,
there is quite a bit of evidence in the Crossville experience to support his view. Prisoners
rushed to the front gates to receive the latest reports from arriving prisoners, as if their
lives depended on the frantic search for a victory. 1 27 Indeed, Hans Albertson remembers
how word of Allied advances slowly convinced him that defeat was imminent, until he
learned of the Battle of the Bulge. At that moment, prisoners' morale "turned around
100%," and "many wise guys said, that they had told us so--all the time!" 1 28 Even
beneath a gradual acceptance of defeat lay an ember of hope for victory.
Another example is Gerhard Hennes's description of officers' attitudes in early
1945. For Hennes, when the war situation was at its worst, "the unspoken order of the
day for us was solidarity one with another [sic] ." The prisoners banded together "as if
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integrity among ourselves assured survival and still made life worthwhile." 1 29 Even
though he was becoming disheartened himself, Hennes expressed disdain for Gilner, an
officer who became openly pessimistic about the war effort and who was suspected of
collaboration with the guards. Shocked and disgusted by this behavior, "most of [the
officers] saw--and avoided--Gilner as a traitor." 1 30 To begin to nurse doubts about the
German war effort was understandable, as long as one held on to the remote possibility of
victory. To abandon the war effort and embrace the enemy, however, was intolerable. In
this case, as with Albertson, Hauser's assertion about "doses of victory" holds true.
.. Even for those who were not ardent Nazis, their resilient morale was linked
directly to Adolf Hitler. As Gansberg explains, Germans who were disinclined toward
Nazism still celebrated the rise in living standards under the Ftihrer. Ian Kershaw has
argued that, once diplomatic and military victories earned Hitler the Germans' faith, he
became the embodiment of German success. Thus, even when Germans criticized the
Nazi party or the war, they adhered to what Kershaw calls the "Hitler myth," the symbol
of German glory. In other words, it was the Filhrer who administered the nation's "doses
of victory." 1 3 1
This reliance on Hitler is manifest in Crossville accounts, and it explains why
prisoners' resilient morale dissipated at the news of their leader's death. According to
Hennes, throughout both good and bad news, soldiers had "clung to f�th in the Ftihrer."
With their leader's demise, reality itself seemed to have been overturned. Hennes
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remembers being "numb for days," and Albertson describes his state of mind as
"depressed, confused, and somewhat mentally deranged." 1 32 As long as Hitler remained,
hope remained; when he died, so did the nationalistic fervor that he had generated.
The implication for reeducation is clear. If support for the German war effort
could not <?Utlive Hitler, then the Filhrer's death would automatically begin, in effect, a
"de-education" of nationalism and totalitarianism. Albertson remembers how "[the]
world seemed to fall apart" at the devastating news. He and his fellow soldiers were left
in a daze, trying "to understand the troubled world, the dark unknown future." 1 33
Combined with the reality of surrender, the destruction of the "myth" exploded any faith
in fascism as a means to national glory.
For some, exposure to the horrors of the concentration camps would reinforce this
"de-education." 1 34 At the end of the war, the PMGO decided to present German prisoners
with firsthand evidence of the concentration camps. One method was the distribution of a
pamphlet, "German Concentration and Prison Camps," to POWs while in transit from
entry ports to their camps. One Military Police Battalion reported "subdued and stoical"
reactions among the train's passengers, and the fact that "most of the P/W's professed
complete ignorance of the existance [sic] of deplorable conditions as portrayed in the
pamphlet." Some prisoners saw the pamphlets as propaganda and summarily discarded
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them, but the information had a definite impact on many others. 1 35
Most POWs, including Albertson and Hennes, learned of the war crimes through
film. After the war had ended, guards across the United States herded POWs into movie
houses, where images of starvation, abuse, and industrialized killing flashed before their
eyes. Hennes, who professes to have known only that the concentration camps were for
"enemies of the people," says that he "had no idea of the extent and ferocity of murdering
innocent people." Upon watching the films, he says, his self-image changed "from being
a hero to being a villain." 1 36 Similarly, Albertson claims to have known only of camps
for "criminals, social misfits, communists, homosexuals and political enemies," adding
that "we never had heard anything about bad or inhumane treatment in those institutions."
After watching the films, he
will never forget those inhumane .cruel and unbelievably horrible pictures . . ..
Only with disgusted repugnance did I have to admit that the film was real! I never
ever heard of these unimaginably gruesome actions before. [For] the first time in
my life I felt that Hitler and his helpers had betrayed us soldiers--! felt ashamed
and angry. Up to this day. 1 37
Admittedly, prisoners who knew about the camps were unlikely to admit as much after
the war. Still, for those who did not know, the shock of the crimes could only discredit
the now-fallen government.
Defeat, destruction, the death of their leader, and confrontation with Germany's
war crimes were far more effective "denazifiers" than were the SPD programs. After all,
as Edward Pluth points out, many German prisoners did not even begin to embrace
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Special Projects programs and literature until after May 1945, when these forces came
into play. 13 8 In the end, National Socialism invalidated itself, leaving the prisoners, and
all Germans, to rebuild their collective psyche.
Incentives for Reconciliation

If the above factors undermined fascist and nationalistic attitudes, what allowed
pro-democracy sentiments to replace them? In truth, life in the POW camps did sway
many prisoners toward the West, but not through calculated programs. Rather, the mere
observation of everyday life in the United States p�esented the Germans with a favorable
view. For Edwin Pelz, a prisoner in Arkansas, courses on democracy were not necessary,
because "even from inside a prisoner-of-war camp we could see the difference between
Germany and America." Gerhard Hennes remembers laughing at the guards' informal
behavior, but adds that he "was impressed by a more civilian society, and not the sort of
snap-to-attention business that they had in the German army." Similarly, prisoners who
read the New York Times were shocked to find that the paper printed both American and
German news communiques, since they were "used to a press that presented only one
line. " 1 39
The SPD poll results quantify these sentiments. Asked what impressed them most
about America, 41 % of the "average" prisoners at Camp Shanks gave answers classified
as "favorable," while only 18% gave "unfavorable" responses. Of the favorable
comments, the most common were freedom of speech and the press (13%), individual
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freedom (8% ), and "the fact that democracy works" (5% ). 1 40 It seems that democracy by
example made an impression on these prisoners.
In addition to the ideological battle, two important factors helped to mend
relations between the U.S. and West Germany. One-on-one contacts between Americans
and Germans, combined with Cold War expediency, allowed the two peoples to cast off
wartime images and embrace each other. While the POW camp experience directly
affected only about 372,000 Germans, it contributed to this bottom-up reconciliation.
Within the camp system, most American personnel and German prisoners looked
beyond wartime stereotypes. While interned, Edwin Pelz realized that "the [American]
uniforms, the weapons, and the languages were different, but their faces were the same as
ours." In spending time together on work assignments, guards and soldiers developed a
degree of empathy, because they endured the same hours and the same weather
conditions. American civilians also found that prisoners held similar concerns about their
loved ones overseas. 1 4 1 In the setting of the POW camps, both Germans and Americans
were able to look beyond the images created by propaganda.
The individual interactions in the U.S. resembled those taking place in the
American Occupation Zone, as described by Petra Goedde. In Gls and Germans, Goedde
examines contacts between American soldiers and German civilians, and their impact on
postwar relations. Her study shows that in Germany, as in the U.S., civilians and enemy
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soldiers found that they had much in common, leading to "a sense of cultural affinity
rather than alienation." Just as in the camps, informal interactions reached such a level
that officials sought, unsuccessfully, to curtail them. In the end, however, they saw the
value of fraternization in fostering cooperation between Americans and Germans, and
actually encouraged it through social programs. 1 42 In both the Occupation Zone and in
the camp system, everyday contacts removed wartime barriers.
The primary difference in the two contexts is that, in Germany, fraternization was
much more sexually charged than in U.S. camps. Goedde explains that war casualties
had driven the female-male ratio in Germany to 160/100, and so most of the Gls'
interactions were with women. Through everyday contacts, dating, and sometimes
marriage, the American soldiers dealt with a "feminized" nation, whose subordination
and dependence contradicted the image of a bitter enemy. No such feminization occurred
in the camps, but captivity had a similar effect. Disarmed, confined, and thousands of
miles from home, the German prisoners experienced an emasculation of their own, and
elicited the same empathy as did civilians in Europe. Hervil McKelvey, a farmer who
employed prisoners in Tennessee, denied the need for guards because "[the Germans]
were all very nice boys, just like ours." While working at the hospital in Camp
Crossville, Evelyn Coulter felt compassion for the German interpreter, who often
expressed his concern for his family in Stuttgart. 143 Even without gender divisions, the
harmlessness of the German-as-prisoner had the same effect.
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Goedde contends that, for Gls, feminization undermined the notion of collective
responsibility, paving the way for forgiveness of the German nation. In their encounters
with destitute families, genial women, and smiling children, American troops questioned
the wartime perception of "a monolithic people unified by their support for the war." In
the same way, the lack of hostility among German prisoners impressed the American
guards and civilians. A guard at Camp Forrest, for instance, found that the majority of
prisoners "were, like himself, draftees who were told--not asked--what to do." Howard
Newton's encounters with the Germans left him with the view that they were "good
soldiers," who simply "had to do what they were told to do." These impressions, like the
camaraderie described in Chapter 2, suggest that Americans drew a distinction between
the German prisoners and the war criminals overseas. 144 In both the camp system and the
Occupation Zone, this separation played a role in the foundation of favorable postwar
relations.
The second component in a speedy reconciliation was the necessity created by the
Cold War. Logically, in the emerging bipolar international system, many Germans saw
the U.S . as the lesser of two evils. Cornelius Fitzgibbon, whose indictment of American
policy in Germany is described above, credits the Cold War with holding together the
flawed occupation authority. Regardless of the controversial political trials, the
disagreements over collective guilt, and the flaws in the Military Government's policies,
Germans readily adhered to the U.S., needing no reminder of "Russian frightfulness." 1 45
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Furthermore, as Goedde says, images of American prosperity provided a strong incentive
to remain in the American sphere, and consumerism was "the essence of [Germany's]
postwar democratic experience." 1 46 Thanks to their fears of Russia and the desire for a
rejuvenated economy, Germans in the U.S. Zone became willing partners with the West.
For their part, the Americans sought to expedite reconciliation, because they
needed another Cold War ally. In The Pledge Betrayed, Tom Bower explains that the
American Military Government reneged on its commitment to punish Nazi collaborators,
because many of them would help to make West Germany a bulwark against
communism. He points out that the Allies devoted more resources to "Project Paperclip,"
a program to locate and employ German scientists, than to finding war criminals, a
mission which "did not even boast a code-name." 147 For the U.S., the focus was on
emerging enemies, not defeated ones.
Bower sees this willingness to pardon Nazi technocrats as a moral failure.
Whatever the moral implications, however, the end result of America's Cold War
pragmatism was the completion of denazification. As explained above, containment of
communism required a strong Germany, and rebuilding the German economy required
the help of men who had worked for Hitler. In exchange for their assistance, German
industrialists earned an implicit pardon. Similarly, politicians like Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer knew that cooperation with the West would allow them to bury Germany's
"brown past." 148 This final step in denazification, then, involved not the removal of the
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men themselves, but rather the removal of a stigma. By allowing former Nazis to fade
into the population, the Americans received a new ally, and the Nazi technocrats rejoined
the civilized world.
In the end, the problems with U.S. reeducation and denazification policy seem to
have been irrelevant. Through both cultural contacts and Cold War pragmatism,
Americans abandoned the perception of the Germans as Nazis. West Germans, who had
witnessed the bankruptcy of totalitarian ideology, saw the U.S. as a source of prosperity
and as an appealing altemative to the Soviets. In providing a forum for these interactions,
the American POW camp system thus contributed to German-American reconciliation.
An examination of the American impact on postwar Germany provides only a
partial explanation of denazification. Indeed, only half of the reeducated German people
were in the West, and fewer still were in the American sphere. To better understand the
impact of bottom-up cultural contacts on postwar Germany, one must also consider
occupation and POW policies in other Allied countries.
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Chapter 4
World War II and Modern Captivity

Hilde Welch was six years old in the summer of 1 944. She lived with her mother
and brother in Frankfurt, Germany, where intense Allied bombings frequently sent them
scrambling for the basement. There had been no word from her father, a German Army
medic, for some time, when suddenly the family received word that he had been captured.
Hilde's mother was relieved that her husband was alive, but she remained concerned. "I
hope the Americans have him, and not the Russians," she said. "If the Russians got him,
he ain't got much of a chance." A few months later, her fears were allayed by a postcard
from Crossville, Tennessee. 149
It is important to remember that a very small percentage of German prisoners of
war actually resided on American soil. At the end of the war, the U.K. held
approximately the same number as the U.S., and the Soviets had captured 3, 1 00,000. 150
To truly understand the significance of America's treatment of prisoners, therefore, one
must discuss it in relation to other Allies' camp systems. Although official U.S. policy
was ineffective in advancing denazification, this comparison will show that its value was
in combining humanity with modernity.
The British Camp System and Reeducation

In many ways, the British system was similar to that of the U.S. The majority of
German prisoners came to the U.K. after the Normandy invasion, and by December 1 945
the island housed nearly 400,000 POWs. Britain distributed approximately half of its
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prisoner population among 1,500 small work camps to fill labor needs throughout the
country. These prisoners, like their comrades in America, had access to books and media
through international organizations, and were generally left alone within the stockade. A
in the U.S. system, this system sometimes led to Nazi domination. 1 5 1
Officials in Britain resembled their American counterparts in their adherence to
the Geneva Convention, and they provided comfortable treatment for their German
charges. Prisoners' rations amounted to 3,300 calories, a level above that of civilians, but
beneath the British soldier's daily intake. After V-E Day, public outcry convinced
authorities to reduce the rations to 2,800 for working prisoners, and 2,000 for non
workers. Colonel Henry Faulk, a British reeducation official, recalls that many
sympathetic employers continued to give prisoners extra food, as had been the case on
American work sites. 1 52
The end of the war brought several changes to camp life in Great Britain. British
authorities screened the same concentration camp footage that the Office of War
Information had distributed to American camps, and prisoners generally displayed the
same mixture of disbelief and shock as did prisoners across the Atlantic. The British, no
longer fearing reprisals against their own POWs after May 1 945, put a number of
prisoners to work clearing mines along the English Channel. 1 53
In terms of reeducation, the British and Americans generally pursued the same
goals. Officials set up the Wilton Park facility to expose prisoners to liberal education
of Military History 66:3 (September 1994), 511.
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techniques and open discussion groups. The Foreign Office's Prisoner of War Di vision
(POWD), like the SPD, hoped to give the prisoners an appreciation for democracy
through firsthand exposure. They also relied on simple statements of fact, rather than
persuasion, with the hope that prisoners would come to democratic conclusions on their
own. These similarities between the two programs are unsurprising, considering the
political and cultural similarities between the two nations. 1 54
Some important differences did exist, however. Colonel Faulk explains that the
POWD' s goal was to create a more altruistic reeducation plan than the American and
Soviet programs, "both of which were essentially political." Wilton Park officials
rejected the idea of training civilian administrators, instead focusing on "general
reeducation." In his description of the reeducation program, Faulk presents his belief that
the key to denazification was the formation of a new "group identity" to replace the one
created by National Socialism. The goal, he says, was to engage students in free
discussions. What mattered was not the actual content of the discussions, but "the tone of
the groups as a means of cultivating . . . a spirit of tolerance and respect for human
dignity." Dispersing the school's 4,800 graduates would spread these democratic
perspectives throughout the POW population, which would in tum carry them into
Germany. 155
One of the most notable features of the British reeducation program is the fact
that, unlike the American SPD, the POWD embraced fraternization. Officials and
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politicians, including several members of Parliament, felt that firsthand views of British
civilians and everyday life would be an excellent way to counteract Nazi propaganda. To
that end, in December 1 946 the government lifted the restriction on interactions between
prisoners and British citizens. In 1947, cooperative German POWs received permission
for limited travel, to handle British money, and eventually to marry. Colonel Faulk hoped
that individual friendships would change individual views, which would then carry over
into "barracks-room discussions" and introduce pro-democracy sentiments into prisoners'
group identity. 156
Unfortunately, British denazification shared some of the same flaws as the
American program. For instance, extending captivity into 1948 became a source of
resentment for prisoners. Smith says that, for prisoners anxious to return home, the delay
in repatriation "overshadowed what would otherwise have lingered on . . . as a pleasant
time full of good will." He points out that, in most of his interviews, POWs vividly recall
their frustration with ongoing captivity. Another bone of contention, as with the U.S.
program, was denazification in the occupation zone. Like the Americans, British officials
gathered up German scientists and technocrats, and acquitted many high-profile officials,
including the industrialist Hermann Abs, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, and
Armaments Minister Albert Speer. As Tom Bower explains, the result was a loss of faith
in British intentions. 157 It seemed that practical needs like labor concerns and Cold War
politics worked their way into the allegedly apolitical British system.
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In its flaws, as well as in its goals, it is clear that the British system had much in
common with its American counterpart. Undoubtedly, the social interactions between
prisoners and civilians aided reeducation in Britain just as they had in the United States.
After the war, and especially after the creation of Bizonia in January 1947, the U.K. also
found itself on the side of prosperity in the emerging Cold War. The Westem countries
and zones thus provided similar camp environments, but their prisoners' experiences
were far removed from those of their counterparts in the East.
The Soviet Camp System and Reeducation

On the Eastern front, mutual hatred reached such a pitch as to make humane
treatment of prisoners unlikely, if not impossible. As part of the plan to physically
exterminate the earners of Bolshevism, German pens held hundreds of thousands of Red
Army prisoners, providing no shelter and inadequate food. Hitler approved their use in
exploitative labor, although their poor health made the program rather ineffective. In the
end, some 3.3 million, or 57.5%, of the Russian prisoners in German hands would perish.
On the other side of the lines, propaganda leaflets assured Red Anny soldiers that
the Germans were "not human beings but wild animals," and that death was the only
proper treatment for the Wehrmacht soldier. As a result, many of the would-be prisoners
were shot immediately upon capture, and those taken into custody fared hardly better. In
addition to generally difficult living standards in Russia, the Red Army employed the
POWs in the dangerous mining and timber industries, as a way to alleviate labor
shortages. While slightly lower, the figures on the Soviet side are also staggering: at least
1 million, or 32%, of the Wehrmacht prisoners died in captivity. Like their German
75

counterparts, the Soviet camps were characterized by excessive brutality. 158
As with the Americans and British, the Russians formed a plan to reeducate the
prisoners in their custody. Arthur Smith explains that the Soviets' Freies Deutschland
(FD) Movement developed much more quickly than did similar programs conducted by
the Western Allies. As early as May 1942, a full year before the U.S. drafted Special
Projects plans, the first Antifa (Antifascist) school for German POWs opened in the
Soviet Union, offering markedly better treatment for cooperative prisoners. The goal was
to instruct the enrollees--many of whom had signed up in exchange for food--in the basic
tenets of Marxism-Leninism. 1 59
The Soviets distributed Antifa graduates throughout the camp system, to spread
antifascist sentiments. In 1943, these prisoners formed the Union of German Officers
(BOO) and the National Committee for a Free Germany (NKFD) for enlisted men.
Among the POWs, these groups' credibility benefited greatly from the leadership of Field
Marshal Friedrich von Paulus and General Walther von Seydlitz, both of whom seethed
over their abandonment by Hitler at Stalingrad. These and other leaders aided the Soviet
war effort by sending radio messages to their German comrades, appealing to them to
surrender. In the event of a separate peace, the Soviets also prepared BOO and NKFD
members to sweep into Germany and assume control. 1 60
Smith explains that, in some ways, the Antifa strategy was superior to the
American and British counterparts. First, he describes as "brilliant" the plan to have
158
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German officers, such as Paulus and Seydlitz, set an example for the enlisted men. He
says that the Soviets gave reeducation a "German face" by conducting courses in German
and by defining the program as anti-Nazi, rather than as pro-Allied. The Red Army also
managed to send over 85,000 prisoners to the Antifa schools, as compared to about
23,100 at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and 4,800 at Wilton Park. Even during the war, the
program seemed so well-conducted that it evoked the envy of American officials. 1 6 1
Like the Americans, the Soviets planned to install reeducated prisoners in postwar
government positions. Unlike the U.S. Military Government, however, the Russian
authority directly aided the Antifas. They began by repatriating 300 German prisoners in
the summer of 1945 , to organize antifascist groups and set up local administrations.
Later, the new Justice administration would hire as many judges and lawyers from among
the returning POWs as possible. A large number of former captives also ended up as
members of the Alert Police, a paramilitary force created in 1948 as a non-Russian means
of maintaining order. 162 In appearance, the use of reeducated prisoners in the Soviet
Occupation Zone was clearly more organized than were similar attempts in the West.
Unfortunately, even an effective occupation policy could not compensate for the
quality of the overall POW experience. While many prisoners in America returned home
with positive memories of their experiences, Russian captivity left a much more negative
impression on both prisoners and East Germans. First, the problem of delayed
repatriation in the West pales in comparison to the fact that nearly a third of the Soviet-
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held POWs remained imprisoned until their deaths. Naimark explains that the retention
of, and lack of contact with, these POWs after the war became a serious publicity
problem for officials in the Soviet Zone. Of those who did return home, many became
disillusioned with the East German administration. Some felt that they had been misled
as to the nature of the Soviet occupation, and those who joined the Alert Police resented
the force's political indoctrination sessions. According to one estimate, as many as 30%
of the returning POWs fled to the West. 163
The U.S.S.R. had little more success in winning over the East German population
in general. One of the primary reasons for this failure was persistent hatred between the
Germans and the Russians. At best, according to Mary Fulbrook, East Germans tried to
make the most of the Soviet occupation, hoping that reunification with the West would
come quickly. At worst, they despised their conquerors. Racist propaganda images could
not disappear overnight, and most Germans found it difficult to submit to a nation of
Untermenschen. Worse still, the degree of physical assaults, looting, and deportations of

political prisoners did little to dispel the barbaric image propagated by the Nazis. 164
Finally, while bottom-up interactions became an asset in the American Zone, the
opposite occurred in the East. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion, the vast number of
rapes committed by Soviet troops constituted a dark counterpart to the sexually-charged
fraternization of the West. According to Norman Naimark, the "ubiquitous threat and the
reality of rape" in the East, whose victims probably numbered in the hundreds of
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thousands, was an experience entirely unknown to other zones. He suggests that the
frustrations of the war, desires for revenge, and mutual racial hatred probably lay at the
root of this violence. In the end, Red Army soldiers' behavior played into the hands of
the noncommunist political parties, who linked the barbarism to the nature of a
communist regime. The fact that female voters flocked to support the Christian
Democrats and Liberal Democrats is, for Naimark, a clear indicator of the rapes' impact
on the Soviet image. If Western fraternization compensated for an ineffective
denazification policy, the inhumane character of this "fraternization" in the East
undermined a more organized attempt at reeducation. 1 65
Whereas American authorities ultimately embraced fraternization, in the end
Soviet officials had to enforce cultural separation. First, Stalin's "anti-cosmopolitan
campaign" to protect the Red Army troops from bourgeois influence kept interactions to a
minimum. After July 1 947, officials completely isolated soldiers from the Germans, to
curb the problems of rape and venereal disease. The policy did advance these goals, but it
also precluded any remaining chance of allowing meaningful interactions at the
individual level. 166 The indelible hostility between troops and civilians left
administrators in a no-win situation and eliminated an important tool for reconciliation.
At the end of the war, before these problems became visible, the Soviet
reeducation program appeared to be superior in its employment of former prisoners. In
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1943, U.S. Anny Intelligence advised the Provost Marshal General to "take a page from
the Russian book" in denazifying POW s. Meanwhile, the Soviets observed the
inconsistent denazifcation polices of the West, and declared a public relations victory.
Over time, however, factors such as Western prosperity and racial hostility contributed to
the defeat of Soviet ambitions in their zone. In both Gennanies, the effects of cultural
attitudes, as described by Petra Goedde and Norman Naimark, trumped those of official
policies. 167
Liberalism and Radicalism: The Nature of Modern Captivity

The above examination of the major Allies' captivity and reeducation policies
shows that success and defeat were divided along East-West lines. It is thus tempting to
view the camp systems through a Cold War lens, and to see the divergence as a triumph
of democracy over communism. However, if one begins with the First World War and
traces common developments in both Soviet and Westem camp systems, the Cold War
image seems inaccurate.
In Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War, Richard Speed compares World War
I camp systems in terms of international standards and multilateral agreements. At the
beginning of the war, he explains, all major belligerents, including Tsarist Russia, tried to
adhere to the 1907 Hague Convention and respect the rights of prisoners, in accordance
with a "liberal tradition" of captivity. By war's end, however, the Bolsheviks fully
embraced a darker "radical tradition," which has since served as a rival to the standards of
the West.
1 67
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As with the later Geneva Convention, the Hague agreement stipulated that
prisoners' labor should "have no connection with the operations of the war," and that
POWs should receive the "board, lodging, and clothing on the same footing as the troops
of the Government who captured them." Third, the convention forbade the forcible use
of prisoners in arms against their home government. In embracing the Hague spirit and
agreeing to a prisoner's inherent right to life, the belligerents embraced what Speed calls
the "liberal tradition." 1 68
Admittedly, some instances of poor treatment did occur in the Great War. For
instance, the British blockade and the infamous "turnip winter" caused general shortages
in Germany, which carried over into the level of treatment of prisoners. Speed notes that
Tsarist Russia, which displayed the least humane conditions, initially made an effort to
comply, but that "circumstance and ineptitude" made for inadequate distribution of
supplies. What is important is that the major belligerents both intended and attempted to
adhere to the Hague standards. Some rule-bending took place, but generally speaking,
"the liberal tradition remained intact." 1 69
In the author's view, the year 1 9 1 5 saw the beginning of a break with the liberal
norm, as Russians' treatment of prisoners marked the new "radical tradition." The first
hint of this radicalization was the use of ethnic favoritism among prisoners. Speed
describes how the Soviets gave Slavic POWs preferential treatment, because the

Richard Speed, Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War: A Study in the Diplomacy of Captivity (New
York, 1990), 3. The text of the 1907 Hague Convention and the 192� Geneva Convention on prisoners of
war are available in Charles Bevins, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of
America, 1 776-1949 (Washington, D.C., 1969).
169
Speed, 6; 73; 109.
168

81

government saw them as "potential recruits in an ethno-political struggle" with Austria
Hungary. By violating the rights of another nation's citizens and by attempting to create a
fifth column after the cessation of hostilities, this tactic violated the liberal spirit. 1 70
Speed argues that the final break came with the Bolshevik takeover in 1917, as the
communists added indoctrination and recruitment of agents to the camp program. First,
they directly violated the Hague Convention by admitting Germans and Austrians into the
Red Army, using food as an incentive. More importantly, the Russians inundated
prisoners with Red propaganda, and repatriated only their "ideological converts" at the
end of the war, to foment class warfare in enemy countries. This transformation of the
POW into an ideological warrior formed the core of the new radical tradition. 1 7 1
To Speed, this liberal-radical split has been present since 1917. "Prisoners were
no longer merely men, whom none could exploit," but were now "potential recruits" in a
greater conflict. This form of captivity has lived on in communist regimes, he argues, and
events such as the reading of propaganda statements by American prisoners in Korea and
Vietnam are part of the radical legacy. He suggests that the tension between the two
captivities will persist "as long as the ideological confrontation between liberal
democracy and communism continues." 1 72
An examination of the Soviet camp system reveals that many of these "radical"
tenets were still in play in the Second World War. Taken alone, the fact that the Soviets
renounced the Geneva Convention indicates a rejection of liberal standards, but
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individual actions and policies add to the radical image of Russian captivity. First,
political indoctrination was central to the German POW experience in Russia. As
explained above, the Antifa schools and agents systematically worked to convey Marxist
Leninist teachings to the prisoners. In the words of Arthur Smith, Russian reeducation
was again "simply another weapon in the war to expand communist domination." The
Russians also gave preferential treatment to those who joined the Antifa programs, and
former prisoners were sometimes given the choice between working in mines or joining
the Alert Police. In offering enlistment as an escape from starvation and hard labor, the
Red Army thus copied its tactics from World War I. 173 This exploitation of prisoners
suggests that Speed's radical tradition was alive and well in the U.S.S.R. in the 1940s.
But if one takes into account similar trends in Allied behavior, the liberal-radical
lines begin to blur. As noted in Chapter 3, American officials realized that reeducation
could be construed as a violation of international law, and as a result they cast their
reeducation effort as an "Intellectual Diversion'' program. As they well understood, their
utilization of the prisoners as tools of democratization represented, like the Soviet
program, an intervention into the neutrality of the prisoners of war as "protected persons."
It is also significant that the Americans saw reeducation as a means of combating not only
its current enemies, the Nazis, but also nascent communist elements in Germany. Thus,
the U.S. planned to utilize the POWs beyond the termination of the war, in the
"ideological confrontation" described by Speed. 1 74
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The use of certain tactics by both "liberal" and "radical" countries suggests that
Speed's model requires revision. In truth, the "radical" view of prisoners as "potential
recruits" applied not only to the Bolsheviks' intended class struggle, but to all sides in the
ideological conflicts of the twentieth century. In conflicts between capitalism and
communism, democracy and totalitarianism, each nation sought to rescue enemy
prisoners from what it considered illegitimate political values. The difference was not
one of intentions, but rather of methods, as seen below.
A more useful method of examining the changing status of the POW is to place
captivity within the context of modernized warfare. Omer Bartov has explained that the
rise of industrialization and mass organization transformed not only the physical nature of
war, but also the morality behind it. The focus on sheer numbers in the First World War
diminished the agency-and value-of the individual combatant. 1 75 This
depersonalization of combat is equally applicable to the treatment of POW s. In the
twentieth century, the growing size and mobility of armies inevitably led to an increase in
the scale of captivity. Just as modernized war devalued the individual soldier, large-scale
imprisonment diminished the integrity of the individual prisoner as a "protected person."
An example of this de-individualization is the commodification of prisoners of
war. Admittedly, camp labor systems had existed for some time, but with total war came
an increase in the scale of POW employment. 1 76 In 19 17, and again in the 1940s, whole
economies strove to meet wartime demands, and large pools of prisoners provided a ready
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solution to labor needs. In America, appraisals of POW' s work potential made sense
during a manpower shortage, and profitability became a plausible explanation for
comfortable treatment. 1 77 This commodification, if less extreme, is not entirely unrelated
to perceptions in Germany and Russia, where labor value became.the sole reason for
feeding prisoners adequately. 1 7 8 In terms of the prisoner-as-resource, the evolution came
not from communism, but from mass organization.
If radical traits extended to all modem countries, is there a strictly "radical
tradition?" In reality, the difference between Speed's traditions is one of degree. The
U.S. saw prisoners as resources, and sought to utilize them in a greater ideological battle,
but it is notable that the Americans did so humanely. As Edwin Pluth points out, even
beyond their obligations under the Geneva Convention, the Americans were simply
"willing to adhere to certain principles." Despite sharp ideological differences with the
Germans, the U.S. stopped short of physically dehumanizing them, and provided all
prisoners the same food and supplies. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the same
modem warfare caused commodification and depersonalization, but Stalin's disregard for
human life carried the radicalization to a greater level of brutality. Perceiving their
prisoners as "the unfinished business of the battlefield," the Russians regarded them as
expendable, and made ideological conversion a condition of survival. More importantly,
as with the German concentration camps, the Gulag system internalized captivity by
making POWs of Russia's own citizens. The extremity of de-individualization in Soviet
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Russia affirms Bartov's view that "totalitarianism is modern utopia brought to its ultimate
concrete conclusion." 1 79
In the final analysis, then, what does a comparison of camp systems say about
captivity in modern, total war? The scale of the world wars led to an increased focus on
numbers and resources, in which the integrity of the individual POW became lost. In this
sense, the United States was just as "radicalized" as the Soviets in its view of the prisoner
as a resource and as an ideological convert. However, it is to the credit of the Americans,
as well as the British, that they held this "radicalization" within limits, and lent an air of
decency to a program whose horrific potential is all too clear. It is their respect for a
prisoner's physical, rather than ideological, integrity that is the true difference between
the twentieth-century traditions.
U.S. policy thus retains its historical significance. If bottom-up interactions
played a greater role in postwar political concerns, one cannot deny that American camp
policy set a humane example in the context of modern warfare. Prisoners at Crossville,
along with 372,000 other German soldiers nationwide, enjoyed a standard of treatment
that can no longer be taken for granted.
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Conclusion

On October 1, 1945, Camp Crossville was to become a branch of Camp Forrest,
in a consolidation of the national camp system. Colonel Dudley would assume a new
post at Fort Benning, Georgia, and his executive officer, Major Robert Brendel, would
take command of the branch camp. Two days before Dudley's departure, the camp staff
held a farewell party. With Mayor Charles Smith and other prominent Crossville
residents in attendance, Dudley thanked the local citizens for their cooperation, and
expressed his gratitude to the camp's civilian and military personnel. Over the next few
months, the camp continued to shrink in size. The last prisoners departed on December
5, 1945, and authorities transferred control of the grounds to the Army Engineers. 1 80
Cumberland County's "civic obligation" had been fulfilled.
In the end, what is the significance of the story of Camp Crossville? First, the
memories of both captors and captives reveal that the positive aspects of camp life are
what impacted their lives. Prisoners' stories center not around political leanings, but
rather around sports, classes, festivities, and artistic pursuits. Guards, civilians, and
German soldiers alike describe the friendly encounters that took place through the barbed
wire, and they emphasize commonalities, rather than differences. These pleasant
memories have survived for decades, indicating that captivity in Crossville, as in other
American camps, had a lasting, benign effect.
Second, these memories prove that "bottom-up" interactions, rather than official
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policies, formed the POWs' views of the U.S. In spite of flawed reeducation policies,
food cuts, and delayed repatriation, the German pri�oners still returned home with an
appreciation for American society. Along with cultural contacts in the Occupation Zone
and the expediencies of the Cold War, the POWs' memories of their captors' benevolence
contributed to a smooth transition into friendly German-American relations.
Finally, as a representation of the national camp system, Crossville shows that the
United States rose above the problems caused by the evolution of modern warfare. The
integrity of the individual prisoner, on which democratic nations based their standards of
captivity, deteriorated in the face of total war and mass resource utilization. But the
standard of living at Crossville and other American camps shows that the U.S. held fast to
the spirit of the Geneva Convention, even after German abuses could have justified its
renunciation. By respecting the physical integrity of its prisoners, the United States
contained de-individualization within the limits of human decency.
Sixty years later, the Crossville facility is the site of a 4-H camp. At bonfires
every summer, counselors regale the campers with stories of the Axis prisoners who once
walked the same grounds, and who enjoyed playing sports and attending classes. They
also tell the tale of Herman the German, a POW who, legend has it, lost his leg in a futile
escape attempt. The children should not venture away at night, the counselors say, lest
they run across Herman's ghost, which is said to roam the grounds in search of his
missing leg.
Whether or not Herman still lingers in the camp, what does remain is the memory
of friendships forged despite the realities of war. Local residents, like the former
88

prisoners who visit from time to time, remember the camp as a bright chapter in an
otherwise dark time. Perhaps Hans Albertson's reflection on Camp Crossville provides
the best summation: "We were treated very well and fair. We could do what we wanted.
We were free to think and talk and discuss. The food was excellent. What more do you
want--especially during a gruesome war?" 1 8 1
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